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INFORMATION-DISSEMINATION LAW: THE
REGULATION OF HOW MARKET-MOVING
INFORMATION IS REVEALED
[101 Cornell L. Rev. __ (2016) (FORTHCOMING)]
Kevin S. Haeberle & M. Todd Henderson†
Corporate information that moves stock-market prices
sits at the center of modern securities regulation. The Great
Depression-era securities laws at the foundation of the field
require much mandatory disclosure of this type of
information. They also include a strict anti-fraud regime to
ensure the credibility of those disclosures of that
information. And for a half century now, that regime has
been interpreted to prohibit insiders from trading on the
same information.
Today, a new body of securities law is emerging on top
of this regulatory structure built around corporate
information.
That
body—which
we
call
“information-dissemination law” (IDL)—focuses on how
important information is revealed to the market. The current
defining feature of IDL is found in requirements that such
information must be disseminated to all investors at the
same exact time in the name of ordinary-investor fairness.
Yet, using a market-microstructure-based understanding of
securities markets, our analysis shows that the ordinaryinvestor benefits of such equal-timing efforts are far from
clear. Indeed, it shows that simultaneity is perversely
harming the most vulnerable ordinary investors.
Accordingly, the Article defines this nascent area of law,
subjects its fairness rhetoric to economic realities, and
explores ways in which it might be reformed to further its
primary stated goal or those of the field more generally—or
even better, both.

† Assistant Professor of Law, University of South Carolina School of Law,
and Michael J. Marks Professor of Law and Mark Claster Mamolen Research
Scholar, University of Chicago Law School, respectively.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the past few years, regulators have repeatedly
decreed that they would end what was quickly becoming a
routine practice: the release of market-moving information to
some investors just prior to the time at which it was being
made available to the entire public. The most prominent
examples of regulatory efforts in the area during this period
involved the New York State Attorney General (NYAG) and the
University of Michigan.
Michigan had been releasing
bimonthly revisions to its Index of Consumer Sentiment to
high-speed traders just seconds before making them widely
available. The famous index contains valuable information
on consumers’ views on the direction of the economy. For
that reason, media and information giant Thomson Reuters
agreed to pay Michigan over $1 million in return for the right
to be the exclusive disseminator of index updates in 2014.1
Pursuant their contract, Thomson then released index
revisions to paying customers before making them widely
available to the public. Thus, Thomson was earning revenues
in return for providing early access to new market-moving
information to those who valued it.
Whether to benefit the robustness of research or that of
the football team, there is no doubt that Michigan could have
legally traded on its work product two seconds, hours, days,
weeks, or months before releasing it to the public. Thomson
could have done the same unless the parties’ contract
provided a basis for concluding otherwise. But these obvious
legal conclusions did not stop the top state-level cop of Wall
1 See Peter Lattman, Thomson Reuters to Suspend Early Peeks at Key
Index,
N.Y.
TIMES
DEALBOOK
(July
7,
2013,
9:06
p.m.),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/07/07/thomson-reuters-to-suspend-earlypeeks-at-key-index/ [https://perma.cc/XRZ 4-NUVC].
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Street from declaring the early-release practice and 1,200 or
so similar ones to constitute “Insider Trading 2.0,” and
putting an end to them after investigations that resulted in
cease and desist agreements.2
This recent initiative (as well as another prominent one
by the SEC)3 is not an isolated incident. For just over a
decade and a half, the SEC’s Regulation Fair Disclosure
(commonly known as “Reg FD”) has required public
companies to make material information available to all
investors at the same exact time when first disseminating it
beyond the firm. But the issue of informational parity, a
central concern of the SEC since the New Deal, is broader
than these examples. The SEC continues to be engaged in a
years-long review of a controversial practice whereby trading
firms “co-locate” their computer servers next to the servers
that run securities exchanges. The proximity between servers
allows those firms’ algorithms to learn of trading activity at
exchanges milliseconds before others. The agency is also
undergoing a review of a similar issue involving that same
trading-activity information, albeit one that centers on
distinct brief time lags: the ones between the time at which
paying subscribers (whether they co-locate or not) receive the
information and that at which the public receives it.

2 See A.G. Schneiderman Announces Marketwired Agreement to End Sales
of News Feeds to High-Frequency Traders, N.Y. STATE OFF. ATT’Y GEN. (Mar. 19,
2014),
http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-schneiderman-announcesmarketwired-agreement-end-sales-news-feeds-high-frequency
[https://perma.cc/3784-NZEF] [hereinafter Schneiderman Announces]; A.G.
Schneiderman Secures Agreement by Thomson Reuters to Stop Offering Early
Access to Market-Moving Information, N.Y. STATE OFF. ATT’Y GEN. (July 8, 2013),
http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-schneiderman-secures-agreementthomson-reuters-stop-offering-early-access-market
[https://perma.cc/9Q2VBW84] [hereinafter Schneiderman Agrees].
In the former press release,
Schneiderman stated that the accord was “part of . . . [his] efforts to end Insider
Trading 2.0—the practice of providing preferred, technologically sophisticated
traders with early access to market-moving information.”
Schneiderman
Announces, supra note 2. We know of no entity offering these types of early
releases after the publicized investigations that ended in the two agreements
and press releases cited in this note.
3 Another prominent recent initiative relates to the early release of
public-company securities disclosures.
In November 2014, academic
researchers, the Wall Street Journal, and Congress (in that order) noted that
some investors were accessing those filings from the SEC’s website or an SEC
information-dissemination contractor, or both, in the seconds and sometimes
even minutes before they were first posted on the SEC’s website. Prodded by
Congress, the agency found itself working to ensure the simultaneous revelation
of these market-moving disclosures.
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Additional behind-the-scenes pressures for equal timing
relating to market-moving information undoubtedly exist.
These examples of initiatives to regulate how and when
market-moving information is disseminated to the public are
not simply political stunts.
Rather, they appear to be
genuinely aimed at a primary goal that is familiar: making the
stock market fairer for ordinary, long-term investors.
Banning sophisticated market participants from obtaining
early access to information, the argument goes, reduces the
asymmetry in valuable information known by pros versus
that known by ordinary Joes—thereby making participation
in the stock market fairer for the latter. The initiatives thus
embody a sacred tenet relating to all these individuals who (in
the aggregate) supply so much of the capital that fuels the
economy’s largest producers. The tenet is that ordinary
investors should, within reason, be put on as level of a
playing field as possible with sophisticated speculators when
it comes to the ability to make a profit in securities markets.4
None of the above should surprise us. With regard to the
market forces, it is clear that there are benefits to being
among the first who are able to obtain, analyze, and trade on
information that will lead to changes in market prices. That
demand, in turn, triggers supply, as there is thus revenue to
be garnered by providing market participants with early
access to that information. And with regard to the regulatory
action, the mandatory-disclosure, securities-fraud, and
insider-trading law that make up the core of modern
securities regulation are motivated in large part by a desire
among policymakers to reduce these types of information
asymmetries.
Against this background, this Article provides something
that the literature has failed to consider with respect to these
early release practices and the legal effort to stop them: a
market-microstructure-based5
examination
of
how
4 The main ultimate aim of this enhanced fairness appears to be twofold.
First, to ensure a specific instance of fairness: that a core American social
institution (the stock market) is fair. And second, to encourage investment in
the companies that produce so much of the country’s goods and services,
thereby—among other things—lowering their cost of capital and, in turn, it is
hoped, the costs of those goods and services.
5 Market microstructure is a branch of economics that studies the forces
at play between buyers and sellers in markets. The principles of the field apply
beyond sophisticated markets for the trading of financial instruments. But they
are mainly applied to those markets—if for no other reason than that relating to
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information revelation is regulated. In so doing, it makes
three main important points.
First, we establish that, taken together, Reg FD and
regulatory action from the past few years can be viewed as
representative of an emerging body of securities law. To date,
to the extent this area of law has been thought about at all,
the inclination has been to treat it as an aspect of the
mandatory-disclosure regime (as seen in Regulation Fair
Disclosure) or insider-trading law (as demonstrated by the
crack down on Insider Trading 2.0). But we argue that the
efforts described above are emblematic of a larger, nascent
body of securities law that can be analytically severed from
disclosure and trading rules. We call this still emerging body
of law “information-dissemination law” (IDL). By IDL, we
mean the set of rules that governs exactly when and how
information that will be announced to the public is
disseminated.
Second, we argue that the basic fairness premise on
which IDL is being built is unsound.
We show why
policymakers have no basis for claiming that the main
simultaneity-based examples of IDL are enhancing
ordinary-investor wellbeing. In fact, our analysis reveals that
efforts to make securities markets fairer for ordinary-investor
trading may be in fact doing the opposite, as at least the
many individuals who trade directly through retail-level
brokerage houses are likely made worse off by IDL today. We
also show how some IDL efforts, like those of the NYAG, harm
ordinary investors on the whole.
Third, our review shows that policymakers should think
about crafting IDL that entails far more than basic
simultaneous-dissemination requirements. By so doing, the
law could better achieve the current primary stated policy
ends of IDL, while also potentially better furthering the other
main end of modern securities law more generally—
enhancing stock-price accuracy. To support these points, we
offer concrete IDL proposals that would enhance ordinaryinvestor wellbeing and a broader conclusion as to how they
might be used in conjunction with another reform to IDL to
improve both fairness and price accuracy at the same time.
the availability of enormous amounts of data relating to those markets. For a
seminal treatise on market microstructure authored by a former chief
economist of the SEC aimed at a broad audience, see LARRY HARRIS, TRADING &
EXCHANGES: MARKET MICROSTRUCTURE FOR PRACTITIONERS 6 (2003).
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To see the main insight of this Article, consider Reg FD,
the centerpiece of IDL.
Reg FD has two distinct, and
opposite, effects on ordinary investors that have been
overlooked in the securities-law literature. The regulation
prohibits firms from engaging in the once-common practice in
which they reveal new information to selective audiences
hours, days, or even weeks before announcing it to the entire
public.
For that reason, throughout sustained periods
leading up to the release of new corporate information, it
reduces the risk that some select group of traders will have
superior information that others lack. The end result is that
the wellbeing of ordinary investors who trade in these
relatively long pre-release periods is improved. However, that
welfare improvement is only slight as a general matter
because the ratio of informed trading to all other trading
during these periods would generally have likely been quite
low for most publicly traded stocks.6 Ultimately, then, Reg
FD improves ordinary-investor wellbeing during those
prolonged pre-release periods—but only slightly so because
the information asymmetries it eliminates would generally
have only imposed a slight negative effect on each member of
the enormous herd of ordinary investors in the market during
those periods.
But, in brief post-release periods, Reg FD does something
very different: it dramatically increases and concentrates this
same information asymmetry. In the seconds after new
information is made publicly available, those who want to
capture a trading profit based on this information must trade
on it immediately, lest the competition beats them to the
punch. Ordinary investors who trade in this period are made
markedly worse off as the execution of their orders to buy
and sell stock are far more likely to be affected by betterinformed pros in those periods than they would be without
the legal intervention.
Stepping back, it becomes clear that the issue of whether
6 As we explain in the Article, in normal times, trading is dominated by the
vast universe of savers who enter and exit positions in order to amass a
diversified portfolio of stocks, balance that portfolio, or liquidate it in whole or
part so that they can use their capital for consumption purposes. When tiered
dissemination takes place over the course of hours, days, or weeks, betterinformed traders aim to complete their trading without tipping off the rest of the
market throughout those relatively long early-advantage windows. Thus, their
trading would likely be composed of a stretched out series of small trades
throughout a tiered-release period that is still dominated by portfolio trading.

HAEBERLE & HENDERSON

108

INFORMATION-DISSEMINATION LAW

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol.101:PPP

ordinary investors are helped or harmed by Reg FD’s
simultaneity mandate depends mainly on whether the small
gains from trading in the sustained pre-release periods that
are slightly safer exceed the large losses from trading in
shorter, now far more dangerous post-release periods. No
empirical study has aimed to quantify these gains and losses,
and the SEC has not supported the rule with any analysis
other than a plea to “fairness.” Indeed, we know of no
previous spotting of any of these issues whatsoever, as the
law’s equal-opportunity approach appears to have precluded
an open conversation about its true effects in the market.
After all, who could come out against the equally timed
dissemination of important information: this approach
furthers the least objectionable type of fairness, since it
focuses on opportunities, not outcomes—and it revolves
around something our society holds sacred (valuable
information).
But, this is just the tip of the iceberg. Reg FD, and the
present simultaneity focus of IDL more generally, has two
additional negative consequences.
The regulation gives
ordinary investors reason to believe that they should be
investing based on changes in firm-specific information (they
shouldn’t) and are safe to engage in this trading in
post-release windows (they aren’t). The Efficient Capital
Markets
Hypothesis
and
Modern
Portfolio
Theory
demonstrate that ordinary investors can improve their
returns for a given level of risk by buying and holding a
diversified portfolio of stocks. Yet by focusing on making
information dissemination “fair,” the SEC implies that
ordinary investors should be using information to inform
stock trades, despite the proof that this is welfare-decreasing
for those investors.
Moreover, even if ordinary investors try to play the
information-trading game, the overwhelming majority of
them—if not all of them altogether—are hopelessly outgunned
by professional investors. Hedge funds, high-speed traders,
and other industry pros trade in millisecond intervals using
high-tech computer algorithms and specialty networks
designed to reduce trading latency to levels unmatchable by
the fastest ordinary investors. Thus, even if it were a good
idea for everyday investors to trade based on changes in
information (and it isn’t), no reasonable regulation can level
the playing field between an ordinary Jane with an e*Trade
account and a high-speed trader. IDL’s attempt to make
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disclosure “fair” and the policymaker reasoning behind it
simply do not hold up under close inspection.
Our analysis also demonstrates that related reform
efforts, such as that of the NYAG, are unambiguously bad for
ordinary investors. The prohibition on the early release of
market-moving information (such as in the case of the
Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index) does nothing more
than move the costs associated with information asymmetry
from a seconds-long period just prior to the public release of
information to a similar one just after that release. In the
end, all the ban has accomplished is a deprivation of the
ability of state universities and the like to earn revenue in
return for their production of valuable information—while
also, like Reg FD, leading the most vulnerable ordinary
investors into value-destroying behavior along the way.
Nevertheless, even if we are right about the ambiguous
effect of Reg FD on ordinary investors, the perverse effect it
has on the most vulnerable ordinary investors, and the
negative effect the NYAG action has on both, IDL might still
be sound policy for one of three reasons.
First, fairness and wellbeing are two distinct concepts.
Even if Reg FD and its more recent outgrowths now leave
ordinary investors worse off, they may still be said to meet
the definition of the former difficult-to-define and
intellectually challenging term. Although this surely has not
been the SEC’s view of what constitutes fairness (nor ours),
perhaps the world is a “fairer” place when Uncle Bob and
Aunt Jane are on a more equal informational footing with
Millennium Capital Management LP—no matter what impact
that fairness has on the number at the bottom of their 401(k)
statement.
Second, perhaps actual fairness is not the true goal here.
Regulators often speak of improving ordinary-investor
confidence in the market in the same breath as improving
ordinary-investor fairness. If ordinary-investor perceptions of
fairness result in those important market participants having
higher levels of confidence in the market, it is possible that
society should care more about perception than reality.
Although knowingly indulging in incorrect assumptions about
what the law does and does not do for ordinary investors may
be undesirable (especially for a field like securities law that
places much of its focus on deterring false or misleading
statements), perhaps our analysis merely leads to the
conclusion that the status quo should continue. But if that
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is the case, discussion of IDL in policymaking and scholarly
circles should be open and honest about its approach.
Lastly, Reg FD was also explicitly motivated by a concern
about the integrity and competitiveness of the process in
which information about public companies’ prospects become
reflected in their stocks’ market prices. Its equal-timing
requirement for the release of corporate disclosures is
thought to remove the incentive to corruptly provide firms
with overly positive analysis in return for early access to their
disclosures, thereby enhancing the integrity of that
price-discovery process. And that same requirement is also
believed
to
increase
the
competiveness
of
the
information-trading business, as anyone who has the ability
and capital necessary to participate in the business can
indeed do so without fear that he will be competing against
other pros who were able to get an early start in the race to
trade on new announcements. These pricing benefits might
justify even an unfair, intellectually dishonest IDL regime in
which ordinary investors incur higher trading costs—
especially when those costs are amortized in a relatively even
way across hundreds of millions of savers. Notably, IDL for
price-accuracy at the expense of fairness is not the stated
approach of any simultaneous-dissemination effort today.
But could IDL be reformed to better achieve its stated
ends as well as those of securities regulation more broadly?
With regard to the concern for ordinary-investor wellbeing
alone, our analysis makes clear that there are a number of
ways in which IDL could be changed to accomplish this end.
For example, the law could add on to existing IDL to require
the provision of notice to the market before releasing any
potential market-moving information. This notice, which we
refer to as “disclosure of disclosure,” would allow ordinary
investors—whose assembling, balancing, and liquidating of
pieces of their diversified portfolios is generally not time
sensitive—to avoid the dangerous trading environment that
ensues after the release of such information. Or, the law
could tack another overlay on IDL: one that mandates set
information-release
periods
with
what
we
call
information-dissemination shot clocks.
Firms and other
information producers could be required to make any
important releases of information in, for example, the first
minute of each hour during the middle hours of the trading
day. So long as the timing and duration of these windows
was made clear to the market, at least the savvy would know
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to avoid engaging in non-time-sensitive portfolio trading
around the top of each of those hours.
Softer approaches are of course possible too. Instead of
devoting resources to policing the timing of disclosures, the
SEC could aim to inform investors about the peril of trying to
beat the pros. Describing the stock market as including two
distinct games—a game for professionals trading on
information and a game for ordinary investors trading with an
eye on a healthy risk premium—with separate rules of the
game for each would be a nice start to such a campaign.
But there is a serious downside to these types of reforms:
they may reduce the incentive for sophisticated professionals
to produce information about stock’s fundamental values,
and impound it into market prices—thereby harming the
other main goal of securities regulation (improving stockprice accuracy). By helping ordinary investors, each of the
contemplated changes would take away trading profits from
the professionals who analyze new information in order to
spot underpriced or overpriced securities.
Given the
long-standing theories as to the connection between higher
levels of stock-price accuracy and the efficiency with which
capital is allocated and quality under which corporations are
governed,7 society would suffer.
Here, then, is where the real work should begin. Instead
of superficial appeals to “fairness,” the SEC and academics
should engage in a systematic analysis of the real impact of
these rules on the various aspects of securities practice and
policy. Intriguing possibilities emerge. For example, perhaps
IDL should be reformed to allow firms to sell early-access
rights to their disclosures in a well-regulated market for
corporate disclosures. Such an innovative approach may
provide firms with the incentive to produce more robust
disclosure products to meet market demand for them, while
also leaving ordinary investors better off than they are today
under existing IDL thanks to the addition of disclosure of
disclosure or the like. Price accuracy may be enhanced even
if sophisticated speculators stand to make less. After all,

7 See generally Merritt B. Fox, Shelf Registration, Integrated Disclosure, and
Underwriter Due Diligence: An Economic Analysis, 70 VA. L. REV. 1005, 1013–14
(1984) (providing an overview of the social benefits of enhanced stock-price
accuracy); Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Cost of “Inaccurate”
Stock Prices, 41 DUKE L.J. 977, 979 (1992) (providing another overview of the
social benefits of enhanced stock-price accuracy).
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corporate information sits at the center of the modern
securities regulation and its attempt to improve price
accuracy, so improving disclosure of that information would
surely, all else equal, improve price accuracy.
Our analysis also opens the door for other interesting
innovations for securities law. For example, it suggests that
the general ordinary-investor fairness concern that animates
a good amount of legislative, judicial, and prosecutorial
thinking on insider-trading law might be better addressed
with, for example, set insider trading periods than the current
porous enforcement regime. So, it is safe to say that the
building blocks we lay down here have import for not just
IDL, but for securities law as a whole.
The detailed version of the story unfolds as follows. Part I
identifies and describes IDL as an emerging area of securities
law—animated primarily by the desire to promote
ordinary-investor fairness, but also one to improve the quality
of the price-discovery process. Part II then provides an
overview of four species of market participants, using
principles from market microstructure to show how they
interact in ways that implicate the design of any regulatory
effort to increase ordinary-investor wellbeing.
Part III
considers how these two parts interact, concluding that Reg
FD affects ordinary investors ambiguously, that the NYAG’s
recent action in the area harms ordinary investors, and that
the SEC’s 2014–2015 initiative has an impact that falls
somewhere between that of these two other initiatives (albeit
closer to that of the NYAG’s one). Part IV discusses these
theory’s implications for IDL by thinking about how our
reforms would enhance ordinary-investor wellbeing, but also
whether that end is desirable in this context given likely
trade-offs (namely, those relating to the accuracy of public
companies’ stock prices). Finally, the conclusion discusses
why this Article’s analysis of how the revelation of new
information is regulated opens the door for intriguing
innovations for the field, including the one IDL reform alluded
to above that could perhaps enhance both ordinary-investor
fairness and stock-price accuracy.
I
AN EMERGING AREA OF SECURITIES REGULATION AND ITS PURPOSE
Modern federal securities regulation is mostly about
information (namely, material corporate information). But it
is composed of several interconnected, yet discrete parts. The
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main foundation comes in the form of the well-known
mandatory-disclosure regime for public companies. This
regime, which dates to the early 1930s, is designed to ensure
that these important players in the economy produce a wide
variety of important information, and share it with outsiders.
Sitting on top of the mandatory-disclosure regime are two
main overlays: a far-ranging set of laws that prohibit fraud in
connection with securities transactions8 as well as a number
of doctrines to circumscribe trading by insiders.9 All of these
laws are said to be designed to make markets fairer for
ordinary investors10 as well as to help generate stock prices
that better reflect firms’ fundamental values.11
As we show in this Part, in recent years, another one of
these distinct layers that sits on top of the mandatorydisclosure regime has been forming: what we have labeled
“information-dissemination law.” IDL seeks to ensure that an
ever-increasing range of market-moving information12 is made
8 See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2012); id. § 17, 15
U.S.C. § 77l; Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j.
9 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77j(b) (2012);
Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2016); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S.
222, 240–41 (1980) (interpreting Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to prohibit
“fraudulent” trading on the basis of material, non-public information by
corporate insiders); United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997) (outlawing
the deceitful misappropriation of material, non-public information for both
insiders and outsiders); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983) (outlawing
tipping-related behavior).
10 See JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., HILLARY A. SALE & M. TODD HENDERSON,
SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 235–36, 1209–11, 1035–37,
1039–42 (6th ed. 2015)
11 See, e.g., Marcel Kahan, supra note 7, at 979 (footnote omitted) (noting
that this “vast legal framework” is motivated “by one principal goal of securities
laws: . . . creat[ing] stock markets in which the market price of a stock
corresponds to its fundamental value.”).
12 Our primary focus is on market-moving information as opposed to
material information. Information “moves markets” when it results in changes
to prices upon being learned by certain market participants. Information is
said to be material when there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable
investor would consider it important in deciding whether to purchase, hold, or
sell. See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). For
many, the terms market-moving and material are interchangeable. But it is
worth noting that some market-moving information may not be of import to “a
reasonable investor.” For example, a large increase in the number of shares
posted at the best (highest) bid prices in the market for IBM stock might move
market prices up. Yet information about that change is unlikely to be
considered important to a reasonable investor.
Likewise, some material
information may not move market prices. For example, some surely consider
information about corporate political spending to be material—even if particular
political spending at issue is likely to have no impact on market prices
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available to all investors at the same exact time when first
being shared with the public. Like mandatory-disclosure,
securities-fraud, and insider-trading law, IDL is focused on
ordinary-investor fairness. In fact, to date, it has been
primarily focused on fairness. But like those more traditional
areas of regulation in the securities area, at least the main
example of IDL (Reg FD) also focuses on enhancing the
accuracy of stocks’ prices. In this Part, we discern this
relatively new area of the law from the securities law that
neighbors it by describing both rules and legal efforts that
compose parts of IDL today, and then by providing an
overview of these policy rationales that drive them.
A. The Law
The defining—indeed almost exclusive—attribute of IDL
today is found in its various simultaneous-dissemination
requirements. The main equal-timing requirement of IDL is
found in Reg FD.13 Promulgated in 2000, that SEC regulation
bars public companies from making disclosures of material
information in a non-simultaneous manner.14 Regulators
have recently expanded on the regulation to cover some
instances in which information was being provided to select
groups of market participants shortly before it was being
more widely released to the public. We consider Reg FD and
these recent related legal efforts in turn here.
1. Reg FD
Prior to 2000, firms often revealed information to favored
investors or analysts before disseminating it to the market as
a whole.15 But in that year, the SEC promulgated Reg FD,
which ended this practice by requiring public companies to
make their disclosures of material, not-yet-public information
available to all potential investors at the same exact time.16

whatsoever.
13 Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. § 243.100 (2016).
14 Id.
15 See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release No.
33-7881 , 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716 (Aug. 24, 2000) [hereinafter Reg FD Adopting
Release].
16 See § 243.100
(“Whenever . . . [a public firm] discloses any material
nonpublic information regarding . . . [itself] or its securities . . . [, it] shall make
public disclosure of that information . . . [s]imultaneously”); Reg FD Adopting
Release, supra note 15, at 51,719 (“As a whole, the regulation requires that
when an issuer makes an intentional disclosure of material nonpublic
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Importantly,
this
simultaneous-dissemination
requirement applies to the disclosure of all material corporate
information—whether or not that disclosure was compelled
by law in the first place. So, firms must make everything
from a mandated formal quarterly report with earnings
information (a 10-Q), on the one hand, to a voluntary press
release on the CEO’s asthma (which may or may not be
required by the law), on the other, available to all members of
the public at the exact same time.
Firms can satisfy this equal-timing requirement in a
variety of ways. For example, they can meet it by providing
their information in: a filing made with the SEC; a press
release through a far-reaching public-relations service; a
well-publicized conference call with broad call-in access; or
even a posting on social media (including Twitter or
Facebook).17 Any method that “is reasonably designed to
effect broad, non-exclusionary distribution of the information
to the public” will do.18
2. Recent Expansions
Over the past few years, both the SEC and the most
prominent state-level regulator of Wall Street have pursued
initiatives to ensure the simultaneous dissemination of
market-moving information in a broader way than that
required under Reg FD.
a. 2014–2015 SEC EDGAR Initiative
Public firms generally file their required disclosures with
the SEC. As such, the agency serves as a central repository
for the well over 100,000 disclosures of corporate information
that are made each year.19 Although companies are not
required to make 10-Ks, 10-Qs, 8-Ks, Form 4s, Form 13Ds,
and so on available to the public for the first time through
this public-filing mechanism, they often do. And that makes
information . . . , it must do so in a manner that provides general public
disclosure, rather than through a selective disclosure.”).
17 See Reg FD Adopting Release, supra note 15, at 51,723–24.
18 Id. at 51,716.
19 See, e.g., Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Wei Jiang & Joshua Mitts, How Quickly
Do Markets Learn? Private Information Dissemination in a Natural Experiment
9
(Apr.
2015),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2544128 [perma.cc/5HB
W-EHMH] (examining a data set of 42,619 filings by public companies in just a
16-week period in middle of 2014).

HAEBERLE & HENDERSON

116

INFORMATION-DISSEMINATION LAW

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol.101:PPP

sense given that the SEC has expressly blessed public filing
with it as a means of disclosure that comports with its
equal-timing mandate.20
As securities lawyers know all too well, the process in
which these carefully reviewed statements are made available
to the public by the SEC begins when they are uploaded by
firms and their counsel to the back end of the agency’s
Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis and Retrieval (EDGAR)
website.21 Less well known—at least until recently—is what
happens behind the scenes between the time at which
corporate disclosures are submitted to EDGAR, and that at
which they become available on the front end of the SEC’s
public EDGAR website. In November 2014, an academic
paper shined light on that process.22
That
academic
study,
along
with
another
23
contemporaneous one, exposed what appears to be an
embarrassing glitch in the handling of all types of disclosures
in this time period between uploading and public availability.
During that gap, the SEC contractors responsible for
disseminating public filings in premium-quality formats were
routinely distributing them to a handful of paying subscribers
just moments after they were first uploaded to the SEC
website, yet before they were posted publicly on it.24 At the
median, it took about ten seconds longer for those filings to
20

See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
According to the SEC’s website, “EDGAR . . . performs automated
collection, validation, indexing, acceptance, and forwarding of submissions by
companies and others who are required by law to file forms with the U.S.
Securities
and
Exchange
Commission.”
Important
Information About EDGAR, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Feb. 16, 2010),
http://www.sec.gov/edgar/aboutedgar.htm [https://perma.cc/V6ZN-533C].
22 See Robert J. Jackson, Jr. & Joshua R. Mitts, How the SEC Helps
Speedy Traders (Columbia Law Sch. Working Paper Series, Working Paper No.
501, 2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2520105
[perma.cc/5YTZ-JKXZ].
23 See Jonathan L. Rogers, Douglas J. Skinner & Sarah L.C. Zechman, Run
EDGAR Run: SEC Dissemination in a High-Frequency World (Chicago Booth
Paper No. 14-36, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2513350 [perma.cc/7K3LET8Y].
24 See Jackson & Mitts, supra note 22, at 4; Rogers, Skinner & Zechman,
supra note 23, at 17. Forty or so clients subscribed to this feed, each paying
about $15,000 annually for it. See Ryan Tracy & Scott Patterson, Fast Traders
Are Getting Data from SEC Seconds Early, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 29, 2014, 2:18
p.m.),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/fast-traders-are-getting-data-from-secseconds-early-1414539997 [https://perma.cc/XG2G-U86Q]; see also Jackson
& Mitts, supra note 22, at app. A (showing that they paid approximately $1,500
per month for the service).
21
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be available on the SEC’s public website than through this
feed.25 The disparity was apparently due to the time that it
took the SEC to format and transfer uploaded files from that
upload location over to the public website.26
Given the well-publicized rise in high-speed trading, it
should come as little surprise that some of the premium
subscribers were traders who were profiting based on their
seconds-early look at material information found in these
disclosures. Those intervals between the time at which the
disclosures became available to them and the time at which
they became available to the general public were
characterized by abnormally high trading volume—and sharp
price movements in the direction that the public disclosure
would soon indicate to the market more generally.27
In response, the SEC ironically found itself engaging in
an effort to ensure that the disclosures that it requires firms
themselves to make available to all investors at the same time
were actually disseminated in that manner when filed
“publicly” with the agency. Indeed, soon after the academic
works summarized here led to a Wall Street Journal article,28
the Commission appeared to have imposed a delay on the
premium-subscriber feed. After that article, most filings on
the feed went out only after they were first posted on
EDGAR’s front-end website—meaning that the subscribers
received the information after it was already in the public

25 See Jackson & Mitts, supra note 22, at 1, 2, 8 (finding that the median
early release was 10.3 seconds early); Rogers, Skinner, & Zechman, supra note
23, at 28. Interestingly, even after outliers were disregarded, lag times varied
greatly. Some feeds came a few seconds early, and others well over a minute.
See Jackson, Jiang & Mitts supra note 19, at 19.
26 See Jackson & Mitts, supra note 22, at 9. The SEC itself was also
making these filings available to investors moments before they were made
public. When disclosures were uploaded to EDGAR, they were immediately
posted to an SEC file-transfer-protocol server. See Jackson & Mitts, supra note
22, at 4. Any tech savvy investor who had access that server could access the
disclosures on it. At the median, those documents were not available on
EDGAR’s front-end website until eleven seconds after they became available on
the server. Id. at 8. However, because the early releases provided by
subscription were accessible in a far more consistent and broader way than
these early releases, we focus on the former.
27 See id. at 13; Rogers, Skinner & Zechman, supra note 23, at 2 (finding
that “prices, volumes, and spreads move [in the direction of the news] 15–30
seconds in advance of when the news is posted to the [public] SEC EDGAR
site”).
28 See Scott Patterson, SEC to Close Gap in Filings’ Release, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 27–28, 2014, at B1.
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domain.29 Thus, the SEC engaged in an initiative to stop a
practice in which public-company disclosures were being
disseminated to high-speed traders anywhere from a handful
of minutes to a few seconds before they were first made
available to the public.
b. New York State Attorney General’s Action
Corporate disclosures are not the only source of material
information that is disclosed to the public. Each year, an
array of private and public entities likewise generates new
information that moves markets, and makes it broadly
available to the public. Some of these entities that produce
this valuable information—such as securities-analysis firms—
specifically gear their information production toward
investors who are looking to buy underpriced securities and
sell overpriced ones.
Others—such as universities,
government agencies, and trade associations—primarily
direct their generation of information toward furthering their
own, non-securities-based ends.
No matter what the primary motivation of its creator,
there has traditionally been no bar on the tiered
dissemination of this type of information. After all, the
production of this information has considerable benefits
(namely, those arising out of more accurate stock prices)30—
and the ability to produce your own information about at
least other entities and profit from trading on it yourself has
long been unquestioned. Nevertheless, last summer, New
York State Attorney General Eric Schneiderman, the most
prominent state-level regulator of Wall Street, put a halt to a
practice in which entities were disseminating this type of
information with unequal timing.31
As you might imagine, in a world of high-speed trading,
these types of early-release practices were becoming
commonplace over the past few years.32 Perhaps thousands
29

See Jackson & Mitts, supra note 22, at 14.
See supra note 7 and accompanying text (discussing the concept of
stock-price accuracy and the social benefits of more accurate stock prices);
infra section I.B.1 (same).
31 See supra Introduction.
32 See, e.g., Brody Mullins, Michael Rothfeld, Tom McGinty & Jenny
Strasburg, Traders Pay for an Early Peek at Key Data, WALL ST. J., June 13,
2013, at A1 (stating that “selling early access [to non-governmental, marketmoving information] is routine.”); Michael Rothfeld & Brody Mullins, Peeks Are
Still
Available
for
Some
Key
Economic
Data,
30
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of such informational work products were routinely being
released early to speedy traders.33 More technically, the
entities who were making these disclosures were selling the
right to distribute them to news-related businesses or other
information-dissemination services. These intermediaries, in
turn, would pass along the information to their clients before
it was made available to the public—including by sending out
a computer-readable early release specifically designed for
high-speed traders.34 Thus, the sale of early-access rights
was emerging as a not-insignificant business for both the
entities that created this information as well as the
intermediaries that purchased the right to disseminate it
early.
A salient example of both the information and types of
early-release practices at issue is found in the dissemination
of the University of Michigan’s Index of Consumer
Sentiment.35
Since just after World War II, the state
university has produced this index that measures the
sentiment of American consumers—assembling the work via
nationwide telephone surveys that inquire into individuals’
views as to the current state of the economy.36 The end
product that results from the surveys is widely thought to
provide key insights into how much American consumers will
spend in the near future. And the amount that Americans
will soon consume of course has serious implications for the
WALL ST. J. (July 8, 2013, 9:19 p.m.),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142412788732486790457859411030977
8332 [https://perma.cc/3NHN-HF28] (“Many high-speed traders and hedge
funds pay nongovernmental organizations for early access to economic reports
and other data that often affect financial markets . . . .”).
33 See Grace Xing Hu, Jun Pan & Jiang Wang, Early Peek Advantage? 8
(Oct. 6, 2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2361311
[https://perma.cc/4HJM-TFRG] (“Thomson Reuters[‘s] . . . low-latency news
feed product . . . releases more than 1200 economic indicators in formats
specially designed for algorithm trading.”).
34 See, e.g., Rosenblum v. Thomson Reuters (Markets) LLC, 984 F. Supp. 2d
141, 143 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (stating that Thomson Reuters purchases the right to
distribute information from various non-governmental sources, and that the
company uses those rights to get high-speed feeds of that information in
computer-readable forms to paying customers).
35 Other prominent examples include the information contained in the
Chicago Business Barometer (a monthly index that measures economic activity
based on surveys of Chicago-area businesses) and the manufacturing index
produced by the Institute for Supply Management, an index “regarded by many
as the single most important economic report coming from the private sector.”
See Mullins, Rothfeld, McGinty & Strasburg, supra note 32.
36 See Hu et al., supra note 33, at 7.
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value of thousands upon thousands of securities. As such, at
around 10:00 a.m. on the second and fourth Fridays of each
month when Michigan publicly releases revisions to its index,
securities prices regularly change.37
Although Michigan provided its twice-a-month index
revisions via a conference call beginning at 9:55 a.m. and on
its website soon after, these revisions reached many before
then.38 The school, like so many other entities that fall far
outside the scope of Reg FD’s public-company coverage, sold
the exclusive right to disseminate its work product early to
Thomson Reuters—garnering approximately $1.4 million in
annual revenue in return.39 Thomson Reuters, in turn, used
its early-distribution rights to sell its own feed of the results
at 9:55 a.m. sharp as well as a premium release at exactly
9:54:58 a.m.40 That premium release—going out just two
seconds prior to the index’s broader 9:55 a.m. subscriberonly and conference-call releases—came in the form of a
computer-readable feed that was specifically designed for
high-speed traders.41
Although anyone who paid the
approximately $6,000-per-month subscription fee42 could
receive that two-second advantage, the group of subscribers
presumably consisted solely of the only traders that could
obtain a time-based advantage in such a short period
(high-speed ones).
But, Attorney General Schneiderman began putting a
37 See, e.g., id. (“[T]he public release of . . . [the Michigan Index of
Consumer Sentiment] can often move financial markets, in ways similar to the
release of official government data such as GDP, inflation and unemployment
numbers.”).
38 Id. at 7–8.
39 See Mullins, Rothfeld, McGinty & Strasburg, supra note 32.
40 Id.
41 See id. (“Thomson Reuters’s marketing materials say the firm offers
paying clients an ‘exclusive 2-second advanced feed of results . . . designed
specifically for algorithmic trading.’” (ellipsis in original)); Hu et al., supra note
33, at 7 (“The earliest wave of release happens at 9:54:58 a.m. . . . [EST], when
Thomson Reuters sends out . . . [Index of Consumer Sentiment] numbers, in a
specialized machine readable format, to a small group of fee-paying, high-speed
clients.”).
42 See Mullins, Rothfeld, McGinty & Strasburg, supra note 32 (“Clients who
pay a subscription fee to Thomson Reuters, which for some is $5,000 a month
plus a $1,025 monthly connection charge, get the high-speed feed at 9:54:58
a.m. Eastern time.”). To follow up on the related examples from note 35, the
Institute for Supply Management sells early access to its revised manufacturing
indices via a high-speed service in return for about $3,000 per month, and the
Chicago Business Barometer sells early access to its measure of local business
activity for approximately $2,600 a year. See id.
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halt to these increasingly common practices in the summer of
2013.43 The prosecutor did not bring formal charges against
the University of Michigan, Thomson Reuters, or any of the
legions of public and private entities that were providing
these sneak peeks at information that they were making
available to the public. But the threat of prosecution—
perhaps along with the unwanted publicity of the
investigation—was more than these entities were willing to
bear. To date, the practice in which this information was
being disseminated to a select few before being made
available to the public more generally appears to have gone
the way of the pre-Reg FD selective release of corporate
information—ending altogether since Schneiderman’s office
entered into agreements with information-dissemination
intermediaries in which those businesses agreed to cease and
desist their tiered dissemination practices.44 In short, those
in the information-dissemination business seem to have little
interest in fighting City Hall in the New York State court
system or in countering prosecutorial press releases in a
broader public-relations war.
B. The Policy Rationales Behind the Law
As the name of the main aspect of IDL (Regulation “Fair”
Disclosure) suggests, simultaneity efforts are primarily—
although not exclusively—driven by the desire to make
securities markets fairer for ordinary investors. This section
summarizes this fairness rationale that drives the law in this
area.
It also briefly introduces other important policy
rationales behind Reg FD.
1. Reg FD
When released, the SEC justified Reg FD mainly on
fairness grounds. However, the agency also asserted two
additional justifications.
One of these additional
justifications is closely related to the fairness one, while the
other is quite distinct. But an understanding of all of these
rationales is vital for understanding simultaneity’s actual
impact on ordinary investors as well as our critique of the
current form of IDL.

43
44

See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text.
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a. Making Securities Markets Fairer for Ordinary
Investors
First and foremost, the SEC promulgated Reg FD to make
market participation fairer for the everyday individuals who
invest directly or indirectly in the stock market. When setting
forth the regulation, the agency itself acknowledged that its
new law was primarily aimed at this end.45 The agency
thought that it was unfair to allow some market participants
a head start in the race to process newly disclosed, material
corporate information. It therefore thought that the law
should help investors by ensuring that they can trade on a
level playing field with securities professionals when new
information is being disclosed to the public.
b. Boosting Investor Confidence in the Market
Second, and relatedly, the SEC asserted that Reg FD was
attractive because it would improve investor confidence in the
market. The Commission noted that it had received much
support
from
individual
investors
for
the
simultaneous-dissemination requirement, and that this
support gave rise to the inference that the requirement would
increase their confidence in the stock market.46
The
reasoning of the agency and the investors who supported
action in this area seems to be straightforward: in a world in
which firms can hand out information in a tiered manner,
some investors (at least individual investors who transact
directly through brokerage accounts) are at a structural
informational disadvantage to some select group of
professional traders. Knowing that, those investors would
have the perception that participating in the stock market

45 See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Exchange Act Release No.
33-7787, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,590, 72,592 (Dec. 28, 1999) [hereinafter Reg FD
Proposing Release] (stating that the main goal of Reg FD is to help increase
“fundamental fairness to all investors.”). The SEC emphasized that “the vast
majority of . . . [those who submitted comment letters in response to the SEC’s
Reg FD proposal] consisted of individual investors,” and that those investors
urged the adoption of the regulation because non-simultaneous dissemination
of corporate disclosures “places them at a severe disadvantage in the market.”
Reg FD Adopting Release, supra note 15, at 51,717.
46 See Reg FD Adopting Release, supra note 15, at 51,718 (“[T]he
overwhelming support from investors for Regulation FD demonstrates a strong
perception among the investing public that selective disclosure is a significant
problem, and shows a corresponding need to prohibit this practice in order to
bolster investor confidence in the fairness of the disclosure process.”).
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involved playing an unfair game.47 They would downgrade
their view of the integrity of the market—meaning that they
would have less confidence in its ability to generate desirable
results for them.
Therefore they might withdraw their
investments or pay less for the investments they were willing
to make. Both of these would lead to undesirable results
from a social welfare perspective.48
c. Enhancing the Quality of the Price-Discovery Process
Third, the Commission argued that this legal reform was
well-reasoned policy for a very distinct reason: it would make
the process in which corporate information is produced and
impounded into stock prices more robust.49 This would lead
to stock prices that better reflect firms’ fundamental values,
which would in turn lead to better capital allocation and
corporate governance.50
The concept of how the simultaneous-dissemination
requirement would make this process more robust is perhaps
best understood by thinking about two ways in which that
process is weakened by permitting disclosures to be released
piecemeal.
First, in a world in which such tiered
dissemination of corporate information is allowed, firms could
choose which securities analysts would be the first to obtain
the material information found in their disclosures. Obvious
conflicts of interest would result, and distortions in the
quality of the analysis of that important information might
therefore arise.51
Of particular concern, these market
participants would be afraid to provide negative analysis of a
firm, since any analyst who did so may quickly find itself
losing favor with the firm the next time it selected the
universe of market participants to which it would provide
such valuable early looks.52

47 See id. at 51,716 (“We believe that the practice of selective disclosure
leads to a loss of investor confidence in the integrity of our capital markets.
Investors who see a security’s price change dramatically and only later are given
access to the information responsible for that move rightly question whether
they are on a level playing field with market insiders.”).
48 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
49 See Reg FD Adopting Release, supra note 15, at 51,718.
50 See supra note 7 and accompanying text (discussing the concept of
stock-price accuracy as well as the social benefits of more accurate prices).
51 See Reg FD Adopting Release, supra note 15, at 51,717.
52 See id. at 51,716 (“Regulation FD is also designed to address . . . the
potential for corporate management to treat material information as a
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Second, in the world in which simultaneity is not
required, some select group of securities analysts and
professional traders has an exclusive on important
information. Knowing this, most—if not all—outside that
group would be foolish to waste time engaging in the
resource-intensive work of procuring, analyzing, and trading
on the information in corporate disclosures. Why engage in
the competition to come in first in that information-based
race if some select group of sophisticated competitors is able
to set off before you? As such, those outside the favored
group will cease to compete—leaving only the selected group
in the information-trading market. With less competition in
that market, the amount and quality of analysis may suffer—
and then the amount and quality of information contained in
stock prices would too.53
In the end, then, in one or both of these ways, permitting
disclosures to be disseminated in a non-simultaneous
fashion, the SEC asserted, would reduce the quality of the
process in which information about firms’ prospects is
produced, analyzed, and incorporated into stock prices—
thereby evoking a closely related larger concern in the field54
for accurate stock pricing and the social benefits associated
with it.
2. Recent Expansions
Fairness is also the main driving force behind the recent
varied, yet related, efforts geared at ensuring the
simultaneous dissemination of valuable information.
a. 2014–2015 SEC EDGAR Initiative
The rationale behind the SEC’s corrective action to stop
the early release of EDGAR filings was predictable. As
lawmakers’ cries indicated, ordinary-investor fairness
compelled an end to the non-simultaneous dissemination of
commodity to be used to gain or maintain favor with particular analysts or
investors.”); id. at 51,717 (“[I]n the absence of a prohibition on selective
disclosure, analysts may feel pressured to report favorably about a company or
otherwise slant their analysis in order to have continued access to selectively
disclosed information.”).
53 For a discussion of the connection between Reg FD and level of
competition in the securities-analysis market, see generally Zohar Goshen &
Gideon Parchomovsky, On Insider Trading, Markets, and “Negative” Property
Rights in Information, 87 VA. L. REV. 1229 (2001).
54 See supra note 7.
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those filings by the SEC and its contractors.55
According to the SEC, EDGAR’s “primary purpose is to
increase the efficiency and fairness of the securities market
for the benefit of investors, corporations, and the economy by
accelerating the receipt, acceptance, dissemination, and
analysis of time-sensitive corporate information filed with the
agency.”56 Moreover, upon learning of the early releases, the
top members of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs, promptly wrote the head of the SEC,
noting that SEC “rules have laid the foundations for some of
the . . . concerns about fairness,” and that “the assertions of
preferred access to EDGAR filings via the SEC’s
systems . . . give credence to th[ose] apprehensions.”57 In
responding to the senate committee, the SEC predictably
emphasized that it was “working to help ensure that the
equity markets remain the deepest and fairest in the world.”58
Members of the House of Representatives struck a similar
tone in response to learning of the SEC’s apparently
inadvertent tiered-dissemination practices. Representative
Carolyn Maloney, representing both the House Financial
Services Committee and the Upper East Side of Manhattan,
posted a press release entitled Maloney Calls on SEC to End
Outrageous Policy That Allows Inside Investors Early Access to
Public Filings.59 That release quotes the congresswoman as
saying the following: “It is extremely distressing that insiders
have been getting an early look at public filings for so long.”60
The release also added that this non-simultaneous
dissemination of corporate filings “violates the basic
principles of fairness that underpin our markets,” and
“urge[d] the SEC to put a stop to this as soon as possible.”61
Even University of Chicago economists seemed to
55

See infra notes 56–61 and accompanying text.
Important Information About EDGAR, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
http://www.sec.gov/edgar/aboutedgar.htm
[https://perma.cc/V6ZN-533C]
(Feb. 16, 2010).
57 Letter from Senators Tim Johnson and Mike Crapo to SEC Chair Mary Jo
White (Dec. 8, 2014) (on file with authors).
58 Letter from SEC Chair Mary Jo White to Senators Johnson and Crapo
(Dec. 23, 2014) (on file with the authors).
59 Maloney Calls on SEC to End Outrageous Policy that Allows Inside
Investors Early Access to Public Filings, CAROLYN B. MALONEY (Oct. 28, 2014),
https://maloney.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/maloney-calls-on-secto-end-outrageous-policy-that-allows-inside [https://perma.cc/U8NB-PN6A].
60 Id.
61 See id.
56
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question the fairness, noting in a paper co-authored with a
University of Colorado economist that these early-release
practices raise questions about whether the SEC
dissemination process is really a level playing field for all
investors.62
b. New York State Attorney General’s Action
The Attorney General likewise primarily cited ordinaryinvestor fairness concerns in putting the kibosh on practices
in which high-speed traders were receiving seconds-early
access to market-moving information. In announcing his
office’s agreement with Thomson Reuters, Attorney General
Eric Schneiderman stated that a “two second advantage is
more than enough time for . . . [high-frequency] traders to
take unfair advantage of their early access to this
information.”63
That same announcement added that
“[p]romoting fairness and avoiding distortions in the
securities markets is an important focus of this office” and
that “the early release of market-moving survey data
undermines fair play in the markets.”64
Moreover, the
announcement added that the agreement “sends a message
that unfair timing advantages for high-frequency traders and
others will not be tolerated by the Attorney General.”65
***
This initial Part has provided an overview of the defining
feature of a growing area of regulation that we have termed
“information-dissemination
law:”
requirements
that
market-moving information be revealed to the market
simultaneously. Although not its only end, primarily in the
name of fairness, the main example of IDL (Reg FD) requires
the information that sits at the center of modern securities
regulation (material corporate information) to be made
available to all members of the public at the same exact time
when it is first disseminated beyond the firm. And the related
efforts discussed here likewise call for the equally timed
dissemination of a wide variety of other valuable information
in furtherance of that same end alone.
II
62
63
64
65

See Rogers, Skinner & Zechman, supra note 23, at 4.
See Schneiderman Agrees, supra note 2.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
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A MODEL OF KEY ASPECTS OF THE AMERICAN STOCK MARKET
In this Part, we set forth a well-established model of key
aspects of the American stock market. Focusing on distinct
types of traders in the stock market as well as the
information asymmetries between them that results in
ordinary investors incurring costs, that model provides the
background necessary to understand both our critique of
IDL’s simultaneous-dissemination requirement in Part III as
well as our contemplated reforms to IDL in Part IV. More
specifically, the model describes the distinct characteristics of
information traders, portfolio traders, noise traders, and
professional-liquidity-providing traders—and presents one
clear
indication
of
the
well-established
asymmetric-information costs (AI costs) that ordinary
investors incur as result of interactions between, on the one
hand, information traders and, on the other, professional
liquidity providers and portfolio traders.66
A. Four Main Types of Traders67
All individuals and entities buying and selling stocks are
in search of financial gain. Yet one can nevertheless break
down these market participants into the four groups
introduced above based on the unique types of financial
motivations and strategies that animate their trading.
1. Information Traders
Information traders generally purchase and sell stocks
based on information as to companies’ fundamental values

66 Here and throughout much of the paper, we predominantly focus on the
parties that are buying and selling stock (traders) rather than on the often
distinct ultimate beneficiaries of their trading (investors). We do so because
IDL’s effects fall on the former in the first instance. For example, we focus on
information traders (e.g., hedge funds) that are buying and selling stock based
on information rather than on the investors (e.g., wealthy individuals) whose
money those traders are investing, or on portfolio traders (e.g., index-based
mutual funds) rather than the investors (e.g., retirement savers) whose money
those traders are investing.
67 Our four-type model of traders is based on common models found in
works in the area of market-microstructure economics. See, e.g., HARRIS, supra
note 5 (providing a model along these lines, albeit with additional detail and
sub-categories unnecessary for present purposes). Models similar to the one we
present here have also appeared in the legal literature.
See Goshen &
Parchomovsky, supra note 53; Kevin Haeberle, Stock-Market Law and the
Accuracy of Public Companies’ Stock Prices, 2015 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 121
(2015).
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that is not yet reflected in market prices.68 Competing as an
information trader today requires exceedingly high levels of
expertise and technological prowess.
Sources of
market-moving information, such as corporate disclosures,
are often complex. Analyzing their import in the context of
vast and ever changing firm-specific and market-wide
information is even more complex.
And beyond these
analytical challenges lies what is sometimes the most
complex part: capturing trading profits based on information
that often depreciates at incredible speeds.69
Thus, to
compete in this game, one must have considerable resources,
including access to first-rate analysis and state-of-the-art
trade-execution systems.
The challenge relating to execution speed calls for
emphasis. Today, the value of some types of market-moving
information—such as that found in at least data-based public
news announcements—often loses its value in literally less
than the blink of an eye.70
It is for this reason that
information traders spend enormous sums not only on
obtaining and processing information, but also on executing
trades at ever shortening latencies.71 Indeed, even when
information-dissemination
practices
such
as
the
seconds-early ones targeted by New York’s Attorney General
and the SEC are eliminated, the information is still released
by the Bloombergs and Thomson Reuters of the world in
computer-readable form to those who pay for it—albeit at the
same exact time as the information is made available in more

68 But see infra note 73 (providing a brief overview of the main exception to
this general statement: information traders that profitably buy and sell based
on short-term market movements that do not reflect the actual consensus
import of fundamental-value information).
69 See infra notes 73–75 and accompanying text.
70 See, e.g., Hu et al., supra note 33, at 3–4 (finding that the new
information contained in a key economic indicator (the Michigan consumersentiment survey discussed earlier) became incorporated into securities prices
within 200 milliseconds of its release). An eye blink lasts about 100–400
milliseconds. See Daniel Ramot, BioNumber Details Page, BIONUMBERS (June
11,
2013,
6:35
a.m.),
http://bionumbers.hms.harvard.edu/bionumber.aspx?s=y&id=100706&ver=0
[https://perma.cc/JG5S-2KAZ].
71 See Eric Budish, Peter Cramton & John Shim, The High-Frequency
Trading Arms Race: Frequent Batch Auctions as a Market Design Response, 130
Q.J. ECON. 1547, 1549 (2015); see also MICHAEL LEWIS, FLASH BOYS: A WALL
STREET REVOLT (2014) (focusing on an effort to reduce the length of
underground cables between trading centers in New York and Chicago in order
to gain microsecond-level trading advantages).
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general formats to all.72 Taken together, these facts dictate
that one particular type of information trader will often be the
one that captures the trading value of newly released data:
the infamous high-speed trader.
Given these attributes, it should come as little surprise
that information trading is generally the realm of institutions.
But not all information traders operate in the same exact
way.
Members of one group—such as the news-based, highspeed traders—buy and sell stocks solely based on their
ability to procure, process, and trade on new computerreadable information.73 From receipt of the information to
completed trade takes only milliseconds.74 As one might
imagine, their analysis of new information for the most part
takes place before they receive it. They use carefully designed
algorithms to buy and sell based on one of many expected
new data points, waiting only for the information to be
inputted into their algorithms.75 There are rumored to be
perhaps a dozen or two of these firms that dominate this type
of high-speed trading.
Those in another group—thousands of private equity
funds, activist hedge funds, and actively managed mutual
funds—rely on the actual human processing of news.76 Their
trading arises out of their own research or that of any one or
more of thousands of firms from which they purchase “buy
side” securities analysis. Importantly, in contrast to the work
of news-based, high-speed traders, the scrutiny of firms’
stock prices performed by these information traders is likely
72

See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
See Merritt B. Fox, Lawrence R. Glosten & Gabriel V. Rauterberg,
Informed Trading and Its Regulation 32–33 (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with the authors) (describing these types of traders, and labeling them
“announcement traders”).
74 See supra note 70.
75 Somewhat amusingly, these pre-programed algorithms misfire from time
to time. See, e.g., Jamila Trindle, Hacked Tweet Prods Revamp, WALL ST. J.
(Apr.
30,
2013,
3:27
p.m.),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142412788732448250457845511400211
4382 (noting that markets dropped by considerable amounts in an instant
when the Associated Press’s hacked Twitter feed reported the words “White
House,” “President Barack Obama,” and “explosions” in the same sentence—
even though the network news correspondents on the White House lawn had
nothing unusual to report).
76 Fox, Glosten & Rauterberg refer to these information traders as
“fundamental value traders.” Fox, Glosten & Rauterberg, supra note 73, at 31
n.61.
73
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vital to ensuring stock-price accuracy. While the former
group’s work merely gets information into stock prices
milliseconds before it would otherwise find its way into those
prices, the latter group’s work often does something very
different: it gets more and better information into stock prices
after post-information-release analysis that occurs not within
milliseconds, but instead over the course of minutes, hours,
days, or even weeks. Still, it is worth noting that once that
study is complete, the trading that occurs in light of it
increasingly happens only through sophisticated algorithmic
trade-execution programs.77
The last important point to note is that whatever their
subtype, information traders move in and out of stock
positions frequently and quickly. Some do so more and faster
than others. On one end of the spectrum, high-speed traders
buy and sell out of positions in large volumes based on the
information in new announcements in well under the time
needed for the blink of an eye. On the other end of that
spectrum, investment funds commonly hold stocks based on
their fundamental-value analysis for sustained periods more
easily measureable in years than milliseconds, seconds,
hours, or even days.
However, even these longer-term
information traders face pressure from the firm-specific risk
associated with loading up on a long or short position in one
or more companies based on information, and therefore
generally trade in and out of those positions far more
frequently than the next type of trader in this market model:
the portfolio trader.
2. Portfolio Traders
Portfolio traders transact to accumulate, maintain, and
liquidate diversified portfolios of stocks.
Some portfolio
traders are individual, ordinary, long-term investors who put
together a wide-ranging basket of stocks through retail-level
online brokerage accounts, such as those offered by the
Charles Schwabs, Vanguards, Fidelities, and TIAA-CREFs of
the world. These investors thus engage in portfolio trading

77 Information traders and other institutional buyers and sellers routinely
pay for services to execute their large trading needs in a manner that has the
least possible impact on market prices.
For example, Goldman Sachs
Execution Services works with investment funds to achieve that end. A number
of businesses that are widely known in industry circles, such as that run by the
Investment Technology Group, also provide these services.
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directly.
But most portfolio trading is attributable to
relatively low-cost intermediaries, such as index-based
mutual funds78 operated by those same securities businesses,
or pension funds79 operated by companies, government
agencies, or, increasingly, labor unions.
The ordinary
investors who participate in the market through these
intermediaries thus engage in portfolio trading only in an
indirect fashion.
Portfolio traders seek monetary gain over long-run
periods by using surplus savings to create wealth for their
future use. But unlike information trading, portfolio trading
does not focus on newly released information about firms’
prospects. Information about individual firms has no direct—
or even proximately indirect—relevance to the enterprise.
Instead, portfolio traders invest as a matter of routine. For
instance, individuals contribute to retirement accounts
through payroll deductions twice a month.
Similarly,
institutional portfolio traders buy and sell to rebalance their
portfolios or meet redemption or subscription demands from
those retirement savers and the like based on their savings
and consumption patterns. In the end, portfolio traders
participate in the market to earn the market-wide risk
premium that is available to those who provide their capital
to public companies in return for the expected payouts
associated with ownership of those equity instruments.80
78 We used actively managed mutual funds above to illustrate information
trading. However, when these funds trade to assemble and maintain diversified
indexes of stocks rather than to beat the market based on fundamental-value
analysis, they are engaging in portfolio trading. There is reason to believe that
a large portion—if not the majority altogether—of these intermediaries’ trading
is actually associated with portfolio trading.
See Jonathan Lewellen,
Institutional Investors and the Limits of Arbitrage, 102 J. FIN. ECON. 62, 77
(2011). After all, even when they conduct their stock picking, they still hold, on
average, 85% or so of their portfolio in a simple diversified index.
79 Here, we include only the trading that pension funds conduct directly in
order to assemble and maintain a diversified portfolio of stocks. We do not
include the information trading that they conduct in their own accounts based
on information, or when they allocate funds to private equity funds, hedge
funds, and actively managed mutual funds to do the same on their behalf.
80 As Modern Portfolio Theory teaches, investors can reduce the riskiness
associated with uncertain future cash flows by holding a diverse portfolio of
stocks. Holding such a basket of stocks effectively eliminates firm-specific risk,
leaving stock owners exposed to only market-wide risk. All else equal, those
who face lower levels of risk as a result of holding rights to varying future cash
flows will place a higher value on any individual stock than those who face
higher levels of risk associated with those holdings—dictating that investors
with diversified portfolios will own a large portion of public equity and earn
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Three final points about portfolio traders bear brief
mention—all three of which are crucial to our ultimate
conclusions.
First, in contrast to information traders, portfolio traders
place a relatively low value on execution speed and timing.
By definition, they are not transacting based on quickly
depreciating information about firms’ prospects relative to
current market prices. Rather, they are simply trying to
assemble and maintain a portfolio that tracks some large part
of the market. Or to liquidate it in light of consumption
needs. So, before their transactions take place, as far as they
know, stock prices during that next interval of time have a
more or less 50-50 chance of increasing or decreasing.81 So,
ex ante, whether their orders to buy and sell pieces of their
portfolios are executed in a fraction of a millisecond, a
second, a minute, an hour, or even perhaps several days is
largely irrelevant to them.
Second, the number of portfolio traders is enormous, and
their trading dominates the stock market during normal
times. Approximately 50% of all Americans invest in the
stock market.82 And countless international investors do the
same. And as some of these many individuals—directly or
indirectly—buy stock to accumulate pieces of their portfolio
each day, and others sell to liquidate pieces of their portfolios
in the same period (and still others trade to rebalance their
diversified portfolios in that period), the ratio of portfolio
trades to informed trades becomes quite high during normal
times. In fact, financial economists have asserted that the
percentage of informed trading in the market in such times
falls merely in the range of 5% or so—with portfolio trading
making up the majority of all other trading.83
whatever premium is available to those who take on market-wide risk.
81 The idea is simply that stock prices follow a random walk after all new
information has been fully incorporated into them. For one of the seminal
works on this concept, see generally Eugene F. Fama, The Behavior of
Stock-Market Prices, 38 J. BUS. 34 (1965) (offering one of the seminal
descriptions of this concept).
82 Justin McCarthy, Little Change in Percentage of Americans Who Own
Stocks, GALLUP (Apr. 22, 2015), http://www.gallup.com/poll/182816/littlechange-percentage-americans-invested-market.aspx [https://perma.cc/QT5GAUPH].
83 See Hadiye Aslan, David Easley, Soeren Hvidkjaer & Maureen O’Hara,
The Characteristics of Informed Trading: Implications for Asset Pricing, 18 J.
EMPIRICAL FIN. 782 (2011); David Easley, Robert F. Engle, Maureen O’Hara &
Liuren Wu, Time-Varying Arrival Rates of Informed and Uninformed Trades, 6 J.
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Lastly, the story of the average portfolio trader is, far
more often than not, a happy one. The average investor who
held a portfolio of stocks that indexed the American stock
market over sustained periods throughout the course of the
twentieth century did quite well. According to the most
famous study of long-term investment returns in modern
markets, these diversified investors earned, on average, a
6.5% post-inflation return per year.84 And those who invested
in indexes of the sixteen largest domestic stock markets in
the world over the same period earned similar market-wide
risk premiums.85 So, whether or not they have a nuanced
familiarity with these financial-economic principles and the
empirical literature in the area, ordinary investors who
assemble portfolios of stock are no fools—unlike the third
type of trader in this model.
3. Noise Traders
Noise traders are a hybrid of information traders and
portfolio traders: they look like the latter, but behave like the
former. Like information traders, noise traders seek to use
new information in order to purchase underpriced stocks or
sell overpriced ones.
However, they trade based on
information that does not actually indicate such a
mispricing—usually because the information on which they
are buying or selling has already been impounded into
market prices by the time they have finished watching Power
Lunch on CNBC. Thus, these market participants operate on
the false premise that they possess a profitable informational
advantage.
An example helps illustrate how these traders operate
and why they generally lose. Suppose that Bud starts a
hedge fund called Fox Investments LP. Suppose too that he
watches cable news one Friday morning in his office while
logged onto his firm’s e*Trade account. Then he waits for the
news to announce expected revisions to the University of
Michigan’s Index of Consumer Sentiment at 9:55 a.m. The
broadcast shares the Michigan announcement, and it’s good
news: the index has gone up. This upward revision is
interpreted as an indication that American consumers feel
FIN. ECONOMETRICS 171 (2008).
84 See ELROY DIMSON, PAUL MARSH & MIKE STAUNTON, TRIUMPH OF THE
OPTIMISTS: 101 YEARS OF GLOBAL INVESTMENT RETURNS 42 (2002).
85 See id.
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better about the state of the economy, and that they are
therefore likely to buy more goods and services from publicly
traded companies. Immediately after seeing the good news,
Bud presses his trigger finger on his keyboard, submitting an
order to purchase some exchange-traded funds that track the
entire domestic market. By the time the order is transacted,
however, those ETFs are no longer underpriced.
The
Michigan results would have to travel from Michigan or its
agents to the news station to be broadcast, and then that
broadcast would still have to make its way up to a satellite,
and down to Fox’s office—all before the fund’s buy order
travels from its computer, along fiber-optic cables to its
brokerage’s servers, which would then likely route the orders
to one of many trading centers for execution. This process
would take at least several seconds, which is an eternity in
the contemporary stock market. Recent research shows that
in this particular example, after the release of the Michigan
data, it is likely that market prices incorporate the news in
just 200 milliseconds86—that is, long before Bud has even
heard the news. So, Fox Investments has simply purchased a
stock index at its new, more accurate price. It is paying what
it is worth, but net of trading fees, it isn’t making a profit on
the stale information it is using to animate the trade.
Critically, the individuals who engage in portfolio trading
through retail brokerage accounts and many of the
ten-thousand-plus investment funds that operate in the
United States87 sit precariously close to the line that divides
them from noise traders. And noise traders do not simply
buy and sell securities at market prices that reflect the most
recent information available. Instead, they act as a mob.
Until better-informed traders correct it, this mob action
causes market prices to go up (based on mob buying) or down
(based on mob selling) beyond what the new information at
issue called for. This means that noise traders often buy at
prices that are actually higher than the price dictated by the
new information, and sell at prices that are actually lower
than that price. It follows that, more often than not, their
trading earns them losses as traders with better abilities to
86

See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
There are estimated to be over 11,000 hedge funds alone. See Lawrence
Delevingne, Hedge Fund Industry Snapshot: $2.6 Trillion in 11,000 Funds, CNBC
(Aug. 31, 2014, 9:00 a.m.), http://www.cnbc.com/2014/08/29/industrysnapshot-26-trillion-in-11000-funds.html [https://perma.cc/JF6M-UGCE].
87
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digest all available information silence the noise.88
4. Professional-Liquidity-Providing Traders
The final type of trader in this market model is the
professional-liquidity-providing one. Professional liquidity
providers buy and sell not for their own directional
investment account, but rather as counterparties who stand
ready, willing, and able to transact with other traders at firm
bid and ask price quotes.
These professionals allow
information traders, portfolio traders, and noise traders to
transact stock immediately with certainty against those
quotes. They focus not on understanding the fundamental
value of the instruments they trade,89 but rather on creating
a two-sided market that allows them to buy stock from some
traders at bid prices that are below the ask prices for which
they sell the stock to other traders.90 When there is lots of
buying against their ask prices, they move both their bid and
ask prices up around what the market appears to think the
new value of the stock is. When there is a good deal of selling
against their bid prices, they do the opposite. Professional
liquidity providers are thus nothing more than the
contemporary, broader version of traditional market
makers—and, like portfolio traders, are market participants
that buy and sell based on extra-informational reasons.
In the old days—that is, about a decade and a half ago—
individuals on the floor of stock exchanges, known as
“specialists,” provided this function for individual stocks.
There was a specialist for IBM and P&G and every other
high-volume public stock, and he stood there ready, willing,
and able to buy from anyone who wanted to sell, and ready,

88 Some traders might be able to consistently predict this type of noise
trading and its short-run effects on market prices. They may therefore, for
example, buy along with noise traders as the noise traders place upward
pressure on prices through their mass buying, and then sell before market
prices are corrected. To the extent that traders do this, they are information
traders and not noise traders. But the information on which they trade is not
socially valuable fundamental-value information that makes prices better
predictors of the future cash flows firms will produce. Rather, it is simply
order-flow and intra-market price-movement information that might erode
price-accuracy.
89 See HARRIS, supra note 5, at 277 (“[Liquidity providers] tend to . . . not
know much about . . . the fundamental values of the instruments that they
trade.”).
90 See, e.g., id. at 401 (“[Liquidity providers] simply try to discover the
prices that produce balanced two-sided order flows.”).
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willing, and able to sell to anyone who wanted to buy. And in
the markets that existed away from the floor of these
exchanges, securities dealers provided this liquidity. Today,
high-frequency traders have replaced these more traditional
market markers.91
A further level of detail is important for what follows.
Professional liquidity providers’ ask prices are, as a general
matter, above the market’s current assessment of a stock’s
fundamental value, and their bid prices are below that
market value—with each spread out equidistantly from it.92 It
is this spacing out of bid and ask prices around current
values that allows professional liquidity providers to earn
their “bid-ask spread.” And by placing their bid quotes and
ask quotes equidistantly—yet not too far—away from stocks’
current market values, they can better attract the even
two-sided flow of trader buy and sell orders that they seek.
Because professional liquidity providers transact at this
bid-ask spread, there is generally a difference between, on the
one hand, the prices at which market participants can
purchase and sell stocks quickly and, on the other, the
market’s valuation of those stocks. This delta dictates that a
trader seeking to buy a stock from a liquidity provider will
generally pay more than the stock’s market value to procure
it, and that a trader who wants to sell a stock to a liquidity
provider will for the most part receive less than that value in
return for it.
Critically, the size of this delta between the market’s
assessment of a stock’s fundamental value and liquidity
providers’ ask and bid prices determines the quality of the
price received by investors who want to trade on demand.
Bid and ask prices that are closer to that market assessment
result in better-quality prices for those who seek to transact
on demand. And conversely, bid and ask prices that are
farther away from that market valuation lead to worse-quality

91 See Jonathan A. Brogaard, High Frequency Tradings and Its Impact on
Market Quality 2 (2010) (unpublished manuscript), https://secure.fia.org/ptgdownloads/hft_trading.pdf [https://perma.cc/BPY4-W97Q] (using a NASDAQ
data set to show that high-frequency traders supply liquidity for over half of all
trades); see generally Albert J. Menkveld, High-Frequency Trading and the New
Market Makers, 16 J. FIN. MKTS. 712, 714 (2013) (describing the rise of the highfrequency trader).
92 See HARRIS, supra note 5, at 287–88 (“[Liquidity providers] . . . set their
bid prices just below fundamental values and their ask prices just above . . . .”).
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ones for those investors.93
An example helps make these important mechanical
points easier to internalize. Assume the market current
values a stock at $10.50 per share. If liquidity providers were
transacting traders’ sell orders for the stock at bid prices of
$10.48 per share, then those traders could sell the stock to
the liquidity providers by accepting the $10.48 price. If the
liquidity providers were also executing other traders’ buy
orders for the stock at ask prices of $10.52 per share, then
those traders could procure it by paying the $10.52 price. As
such, when a liquidity provider buys the stock at its best
(highest) bid price of $10.48 per share from a trader’s sell
order, and then turns around and sells those shares to
another trader at its best (lowest) ask price of $10.52 per
share, it would earn $0.04 per each share bought and then
sold. And from the perspective of other traders, there would
thus be a $0.02 spread cost associated with either buying
from, or selling to, these liquidity providers—as buyers must
pay $10.52 for a stock worth $10.50, and sellers only receive
$10.48 for the same. If the liquidity providers were instead
posting best (highest) bid prices of $10.00 and best (lowest)
ask prices of $11.00 around that same $10.50 market value,
traders seeking to transact on demand against them would be
receiving markedly inferior prices.
What determines the quality of these liquidity-provider
prices?
As we discuss in the next section, the most
important determinant of the quality of liquidity-provider
prices in the market is generally information asymmetry.94
93 The quality of these prices is determined by much more than simply the
spread between the best (highest) bid prices and the best (lowest) ask prices in
the market. Liquidity providers post only a limited number of shares at those
prices. They then post limited numbers of shares at a series of successively
inferior bid prices and ask prices. So, the quality of the prices received by
traders who transact on demand in this fashion generally depends on the
quality of a mix of quoted prices and the number of shares available at them—
and not simply on the prices associated with the best bids and asks.
94 Although professional liquidity providers make a business out of posting
bid and ask quotes and earning their spreads, all other traders also can attempt
to complete some of their trading by posting quotes against which other market
participants can transact. That is, information, portfolio, and noise traders
may try to achieve their buying needs not by transacting against liquidity
providers’ ask prices on demand, but instead by posting bids of their own—or
complete their selling not by executing against liquidity providers’ bid prices
right away, but instead by quoting asks of their own. Today, at least on the
registered exchanges where most trading takes place, any market participant
can freely attempt to accomplish its trading needs via providing liquidity to
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B. Information Asymmetries and the Main Costs It
Imposes
Talk of the concern for the harm that the ordinary,
long-term investors incur at the hands of sophisticated pros
who have better information is common.95 It would be unfair
in many circumstances, the thinking goes, if these
individuals who invest directly through retail-level brokerage
accounts or indirectly through portfolio-trading investment
funds suffered losses as a result of investing in a market in
which better-informed traders lurk.
These information
asymmetries and the “information-asymmetry costs” (IA
costs) to which they give rise are the main costs about which
regulators are concerned when they attempt to improve
ordinary-investor fairness.96
Given the centrality of the
concern for these asymmetries and related costs to IDL today
and the nature of our critique of its present form in Parts III
and IV below, this section transitions to that original analysis
by describing the most apparent way in which IA costs are
observed in the market.
The clearest indication of the IA costs that portfolio
traders incur is found in the quality of liquidity-provider
pricing in the market. When professional liquidity providers
hold out their firm quotes to the market, they make
themselves vulnerable to traders who have better information
on the true value of stocks. Professional liquidity providers
thus often find themselves on the other side of trades with
better-informed traders. This vulnerability makes sense.
Professional liquidity providers are specialized market
participants that learn the news through the flow of orders
sent their way rather than based on their own analysis of new
fundamental-value information before it becomes reflected in
market prices.97 Once again, their focus is instead on setting

other traders in this manner. Each registered exchange must allow brokers or
dealers to become members of its exchange. See Securities and Exchange Act
§ 6(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(2) (2012). And all exchanges must post bid and ask
quotes submitted by their members. See Regulation National Market System
Rule 604, 17 C.F.R. § 242.604 (2016). When traders sit back and patiently buy
and sell by waiting for other market participants to transact against their bid
and ask quotes, respectively, in this way, they are said to “make” liquidity for
the market. (In contrast, when they transact against other liquidity providers’
quotes, they are said to “take” liquidity.).
95 See supra section I.A.2.a.
96 See supra Introduction.
97 See supra section II.A.4.
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bid and ask prices that will produce an even two-sided flow of
incoming buy and sell orders, thereby allowing them to earn a
bid-ask spread from a long line of liquidity-demanding
portfolio traders.98 Focusing on things like the ratio of buy
and sell orders that come their way rather than on things like
the import of new corporate earnings’ announcements,
professional liquidity providers frequently find themselves at
an informational disadvantage when they supply their
services to information traders—and therefore sustain trading
losses to them.99
All else being equal, when professional liquidity providers
expect to incur larger losses at the hands of better-informed
traders in any given time period, they quote inferior prices to
the market.100 By quoting bid prices that are further south
from a stock’s current value, and ask prices further north
from that same value, they better deter information traders
from trading opposite them by reducing their trading
profits.101 Thus, professional liquidity providers will quote
worse prices (i.e.., prices further away from current market
values) when they expect a higher chance of transacting
opposite better-informed traders.102
98

See supra notes 91–94 and accompanying text.
See HARRIS, supra note 5, at 299 (“[I]nformed traders choose the side of
the market on which they trade, and the . . . [professional liquidity providers]
end up losing money to them.”). For a more detailed explanation in the legal
literature of exactly how information traders impose losses on professional
liquidity providers, see Haeberle, supra note 67.
100 For the seminal work modeling this information asymmetry and the
adverse-selection issues associated with it, see HARRIS, supra note 5, at 6, 298;
Lawrence R. Glosten & Paul R. Milgrom, Bid, Ask and Transaction Prices in a
Specialist Market with Heterogeneously Informed Traders, 14 J. FIN. ECON. 71,
75 (1985);.
101 Glosten & Milgrom, supra note 100. Quoting inferior prices also helps
liquidity providers in a second way: by increasing the amount of their take from
each “roundtrip transaction,” in industry parlance, in which they are able to
buy at their bid and turn around and sell at their ask opposite portfolio traders
whose trading—unlike that of information traders—generally does not move
prices. This helps them make up their losses through a steady spread with bid
(buy) transactions at prices that are in fact lower than ask (sell) transactions.
For the original work modeling the main way in which these liquidity providers
offset their losses to information traders by transacting with “uninformed”
investors, see Albert S. Kyle, Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading, 53
ECONOMETRICA 1315 (1985). See also HARRIS, supra note 5, at 299.
102 In today’s market, the average spread between the best (highest) bid
price for a stock and the best (lowest) ask price is quite small. For thickly
traded large-capitalization stocks, the size of this spread is usually in the
one-cent range and for thinly traded small-capitalization stock, that spread is
typically in the nine-cent range.
See, e.g., CFA INSTITUTE, DARK POOLS,
99
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This conclusion has special import for more than just
professional liquidity providers.
Of significance here, it
means that portfolio traders—and therefore ordinary
investors—will face inferior prices when transacting against
liquidity-provider quotes during periods of high information
asymmetry in the market. Simply put, when information
traders have knowledge of information that is not yet
incorporated into market prices, liquidity providers—
perceiving an asymmetry in information know by them versus
that known by information traders based on the one-side buy
(or sell) orders they are receiving—will protect themselves by
quoting inferior prices until the information asymmetry is
resolved.103 And during those periods, portfolio traders—and
consequently ordinary investors—will face inferior prices.
Whether or not articulated in this fine-tuned way, it is mainly
these IA costs that drive the concern for the harm that
ordinary, long-term investors incur as a result of
participating in a market in which better-informed traders
lurk. And it is these IA costs embodied in price quotes of
inferior quality that we use next to show previously
unidentified effects of IDL on ordinary-investor wellbeing.104
***
As this basic model of key aspects of the American stock
market illustrates, four entirely different types of traders
inhabit the market. While each of them is after financial
INTERNALIZATION,
AND
EQUITY
MARKET
QUALITY
5
(2012),
http://www.cfapubs.org/doi/pdf/10.2469/ccb.v2012.n5.1.
However, even
stocks with average spreads of a mere penny will have periods in which their
spreads are far larger. And liquidity providers only quote limited quantities at
their best prices, and then post limited quantities at a series of successively
inferior ones. See supra note 93. Thus, a liquidity provider may protect itself in
the way mentioned in the text by quoting inferior prices in two ways: by
increasing the size of the spread between its best bid and ask prices for a period
of time or by thinning out its offerings both its best bids and asks as well as all
successively inferior bids and asks, or both.
103 See supra section II.A.4. Notably, these inferior prices are often material
even when traders are buying and selling large-capitalization stocks that on
average have a $0.01 spread between the best bid and ask prices available in
the market.
Once again, the size of those average spreads fluctuates
throughout the trading day, and at least large traders are concerned with both
that size and the fact that they will often have to transact against limited
numbers of shares at both those best prices as well as at a series of
successively inferior bid and ask prices. See supra note 100.
104
For a deeper look at the way in which portfolio traders incur IA costs,
see Kevin S. Haeberle, Welcoming Information Asymmetry: The Case for
Reversing the Investor-Protection Presumption (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with the authors).
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gain, their very different motivations and strategies lead to
them interacting in complex ways.
Of paramount
significance, information traders profit by discovering and
bringing new information to the market. But to gain from
speculating on this information, these traders must
necessarily impose losses on some other traders. In this Part,
we have shown how they do so—focusing on the direct losses
they impose on professional market makers, the
inferior-quote response by those professionals, and the
resulting higher IA costs incurred by ordinary investors.
In the next Part, we build on this model to do what the
securities regulators have apparently failed to do: attempt to
see the true effects of the equal-timing requirements at the
heart of IDL today on these IA costs. We thus explain how
this growing and under-theorized area of the law actually
affects the wellbeing of not only an important group of market
participants who policymakers have long sought to protect as
a general matter, but also the very group of investors who are
alleged to be the principal beneficiaries of that area of law.
III
THE ACTUAL EFFECTS OF IDL ON ORDINARY INVESTORS’
WELLBEING
In
this
Part
we
show
how
the
simultaneous-dissemination requirements that define IDL
today actually affect ordinary investors. We do so by first
looking at how they affect information asymmetries in the
market generally, and then by examining the impact of those
effects on specific groups of everyday investors. In the end,
we conclude that Reg FD has an ambiguous impact on the
welfare of ordinary investors on the whole. We also explain
some promise onto which it appears to have stumbled. But
at the same time, we discuss why there is strong reason to
believe that the regulation is perversely making things worse
for the ordinary investors who stand in the most precarious
position in the market (those who trade directly through
brokerage accounts rather than indirectly through funds).
We also theorize that the NYAG initiative from the past few
years
that
has
stopped
seconds-early
access
to
market-moving information leaves ordinary investors worse
off than they would be without it. And we briefly touch on
why the SEC’s 2014–2015 EDGAR initiative has an impact
that falls somewhere between that of Reg FD and the NYAG’s
action—although closer to the latter. Thus, in this Part, we
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analyze the extent to which the current form of each of these
examples of IDL furthers its primary stated ends.
A. Effects on Information Asymmetries in the Market
Generally
To see how Reg FD and the related recent efforts affect
the wellbeing of ordinary investors in general, one must think
about the nature of information asymmetries in the market
after new information is released in two worlds. The first
world is the one in which we live today. The second is a
hypothetical parallel one in which information producers are
freely permitted to reveal their information in a tiered manner
before sharing it more widely.
1. Information Asymmetries in Post-Release Periods
When Simultaneity is Required
Simultaneous-dissemination
requirements
have
important effects on the trading environment in the tens of
thousands of periods105 throughout the year that occur after
market-moving information is first released beyond those who
are barred from trading on it.
When new information is first released to all potential
investors at the same exact time in compliance with the law
today, information traders immediately procure, process, and
trade on it. All the while, at least those who specialize in
something other than such speculative trading remain in the
dark on at least the import of the new information for some
period—even if they have the right to access it equally. In
many cases, the informational disadvantage will be
attributable
to
a
lack
of
access
to
hyper-fast
information-dissemination and trade-execution systems. In
others, the issue will generally boil down to a lack of interest
in the new information.106 Thus, when public companies and

105 See, e.g., Jackson, Jiang & Mitts, supra note 19, at 9 (showing that over
40,000 filings by public companies were made during one 16-week period in
2014). Although so many public-firm disclosure filings are made each year,
only some subset of them contains market-moving information. And, only a
subset of those disclosures is released during the trading day. Whatever the
exact number of important disclosures released during normal trading hours,
two things are clear: the 5,000 or so United States public firms combine to
make a very large number of disclosures that move market prices, and other
entities that sit far outside the scope of mandatory-disclosure law also release a
large number of similar informational products.
106 See supra section II.A (comparing information traders’ focus on new
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other important information producers initially release
information today, there is a period characterized by an
asymmetry in information known by sophisticated
information-trading pros and that known by almost all other
market participants.
Crucially, though, this post-release period of heightened
information asymmetry before business as usual picks up
again must be both acute and short-lived.
Thanks to
equal-timing requirements, any trader can access corporate
disclosures and the like as soon as they are released. It
follows that those who aim to profit by trading based on at
least relatively clear inferences from the released information
must procure it, analyze it, and execute on it immediately—
lest the competition beats them to the punch. In fact, in
today’s high-speed, electronic stock market, the value of at
least computer-readable information with import for market
prices that can be evaluated with consensus valuation
models is thought to disappear altogether within well under a
second of its public release.
Both recent empirical study and industry practice
evidence this conclusion. With regard to the former, financial
economists studied the trading environment associated with
the release of the data found in the University of Michigan
Index of Consumer Sentiment. They found that, when it was
known that this relatively easy-to-interpret information would
be made available to the entire public shortly, the information
routinely became incorporated into market prices with a
flurry of trading activity within just 200 milliseconds of its
release to a dozen or so information traders.107 With regard to
the latter, the information asymmetries are so powerful
during post-release periods today that professional liquidity
providers are known to cease to supply their services
altogether when they expect or begin to detect the trading
associated with the release of new information.108 By taking

market-moving information to the extra-informational bases on which portfolio
traders and professional liquidity providers trade).
107 Hu et al., supra note 33, at 22–26; see supra notes 32–35 and
accompanying text.
108 On a panel at a securities-law conference at Columbia Law School with
one of us in November of 2014, the CEO of one of the largest liquidity providers
in the market today acknowledged this common response to the public release
of new information. Douglas Cifu, CEO, Virtu Financial LLC, Remarks at
Columbia Law School conference on “Current Issues in Securities Regulation:
The Hot Topics” (Nov. 21, 2014).
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the exceptional step of removing themselves altogether from
the market during these brief bursts of information
asymmetry, they broadly protect themselves from incurring
losses to better-informed traders around the time at which
they occur.109
Of course, evaluating the true import of other
harder-to-digest information may instead take much longer.
But in a world with the current equal-timing mandates,
information traders have little time to waste when it comes to
the fast and furious race to profit based on even that type of
newly shared information. They can either analyze the new
information and trade on it as quickly as the competition, or
sit this particular game out altogether.
Ultimately, then, under current IDL, a large amount of
information asymmetry is often condensed into a small period
of time lasting as little as well under a second that ensues
after new information is made available to all investors.
2. Information Asymmetries in Post-Release Periods that
Would Exist if Tiered Dissemination Were Allowed
To be sure, even in a world without the current
simultaneous-dissemination requirements, there would still
be heightened information asymmetries in the market
following the release of new information.
But those
asymmetries after the time at which that information would
first begin to be exposed to the market would generally look
very different.
Without Reg FD, public companies could reveal their
material information piecemeal to select traders before
sharing it with the public. In a hypothetical world in which
the regulation did not exist, then, some information traders
would at times be able to access, analyze, and trade on
information before the market more generally was even aware
that it had been released. These fortunate traders would no
doubt use the information to trade profitably as soon as they
got their hands on it, aiming to buy underpriced stocks and
sell overpriced ones opposite unknowing counterparties—just
like in the current world where simultaneity is required.
Critically, however, while the select traders with this type of

109 See supra section II.A.4 (explaining how professional liquidity providers
protect themselves from better-informed traders in the market by quoting
inferior prices).
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informational advantage would want to act on the advantage
before it dissipates, they would also have an incentive to
attempt to trade under the radar in smaller increments over
time. This type of trading approach would allow them to
accumulate larger positions before their trading moves prices.
This makes sense. If they instead pursued a fast-and-furious
approach to trading like the one that must occur in
post-(simultaneous) release periods today, then their own
market activity would tip their hands to the market—thereby
eliminating their informational advantage. Thus, they would
try to build up their trading position over time with quiet, yet
sustained, trading.110
Recent empirical study supports the notion that trading
takes place in this manner when traders know that they have
access to information significantly ahead of the time at which
it will become more widely available. In fact, “significantly
ahead of time” may include time-based advantages limited to
a few minutes.111
These observations give rise to the inference that
information asymmetries in the stock market would be higher
than normal after the first stages of (tiered) information
release in this hypothetical world in which tiered information
revelation were allowed. However, because the concern for
the dissipation of the informational advantage does not
dominate as it does when information must be disseminated
to all at once, we should expect only slightly heightened
asymmetry over the weeks, days, hours, and even minutes
leading up to the time at which the information is expected to
be announced to the public. The exact length of the period of
heightened information asymmetry would depend on just how
far ahead the initial tiered releases of the information began
before the full public release of the information.
Of paramount importance, though, so long as the earlier
releases occurred more than a handful of seconds or even
minutes before the full public release, the information
asymmetry would be of low-grade variety throughout a
110 Recent empirical work evidences this phenomenon. See René Caldentey
& Ennio Stacchetti, Insider Trading with a Random Deadline, 78 ECONOMETRICA
245, 245–48 (2010).
111 See Jackson, Jiang & Mitts, supra note 19, at 4, 25–26 (showing that
when traders had an informational advantage based on early access to EDGAR
filings in 2014–2015 that was expected to last a few minutes, as opposed to
seconds, they spread out their trading throughout those minutes to avoid
signaling their information to the market).
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sustained period.
After all, the portfolio trading that
dominates normal times112 would generally continue on
throughout these periods. Indeed, if the post-(tiered) release
trading by information traders is spread out over enough
time, an enormous number of portfolio traders would come
and go in and out of the market throughout that time.113
Thus, with the overwhelming majority of all activity in the
market still attributable to non-information-based trading
during these periods, there would only be a slightly higher
chance than normal for any given trader to find himself at an
informational disadvantage in the market.
Accordingly, in a world in which corporate information
may be revealed piecemeal without restraint, market-moving
information would often leak out over time—and, in contrast
to today’s post-release bursts, would then involve only
slightly heightened information asymmetries distributed in a
relatively smooth manner over a relatively large period of time
leading up to the one at which the underlying information
became more broadly available.
Of course, post-(tiered) release trading in a world without
the NYAG’s equal-timing effort would look different. In that
world, some information would merely be released to some
traders seconds before being disseminated to the entire
marketplace.
So, information asymmetries during those
seconds would be hefty. And because so much of the import
of the information would likely be incorporated into prices
within those seconds-early periods alone,114 the information
asymmetries associated with more normal times would return
soon enough. In fact, this is just what happened when the
University of Michigan released its market-moving index early
to high-speed traders in 2013 and 2014 before the NYAG put
an end to that practice: the new information in the index was
routinely incorporated into prices in just the first 200
milliseconds of the two-second-early release, with trading
then quickly returning to normal.115
Lastly, the information asymmetries in a post-(tiered)
release market when trading based on seconds- or
112

See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
114 See Hu et al., supra note 33, at 22–26; supra notes 35–39, 45–47 and
accompanying text.
115 See Hu et al., supra note 33, at 22–26; supra notes 35–39, 45–47 and
accompanying text.
113
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minutes-early access to EDGAR filings or the like is permitted
looks similar—albeit with the acute asymmetries spread out
over more than merely two seconds or so. This conclusion
flows from the fact that EDGAR filings were often released by
far more than merely two seconds in advance (with many
coming in at more like three-to-five minutes), and that
knowledge of the early-release did not seem to be widely
known. So, information traders with somewhat secretive
access to these types of “public” filings before the public
gained access to them would likely be able to complete their
trading slowly throughout, for example, an early-advantage
minute or two. In fact, recent empirical study evidences just
this type of trading by information traders when those traders
had several minutes to complete their early-peak trading
based on these filings as opposed to some far smaller amount
of time.116
3. Conclusion as to the Overall Effects of Simultaneity on
Information Asymmetries Today
The above comparisons of the behavior of information
traders in a world with and without the types of existing
equal-timing requirements examined here makes clear that
those requirements have considerable effects on the
asymmetry in information known by information traders and
all other participants in the market after information is
released. But with this background on those asymmetries in
both a world with and without these requirements, the overall
general impact of those efforts on information asymmetries
both before and after new information is released becomes
clear.
At the outset, Reg FD has eliminated much trading based
on material, non-public corporate information that was
previously taking place in the hours, days, and weeks leading
up to the time at which the information was being released to
the public.117 Consequently, if tiered dissemination were
instead allowed over this sustained period today, information
producers would begin to selectively release their information
well before its public announcement. Asymmetries between
116 Jackson, Mitts & Jiang, supra note 19, evidence this drawn-out-trading
result for such longer early releases when studying these very SEC releases; see
supra section I.A.2 (discussing this trading dynamic more generally).
117 See supra section III.A.1 (describing the type of selective-release trading
that Reg FD eliminated).
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information traders and all other market participants would
therefore be higher than normal during those post-(tiered)
release periods. That is simply our hypothetical world in
which tiered dissemination is allowed.118 What this means is
that by banning the once-common practice of tiered
dissemination of corporate disclosures, Reg FD slightly
reduces information asymmetries throughout prolonged
periods that take place before information is first released (to
all at once) today.
But these improvements in information asymmetry are
not free.
Rather, there is a trade-off.
In suppressing
information trading in the period leading up to the mandatory
widespread release of corporate disclosures, Reg FD causes
there to be markedly higher asymmetries during brief
post-release periods. This conclusion is simply the one
presented earlier: that the regulation creates these bursts of
information asymmetry by preventing new information and
much (or even any) of its import from seeping out through
earlier tiered dissemination, and then leaves information
traders without the luxury of time to complete their trading in
an under-the-radar fashion.119
Combining these two insights allows us to offer the
following theoretical conclusion about Reg FD’s general effect
on information asymmetries in the market around the times
at which new information is released today: the law results in
asymmetries throughout prolonged periods that are slightly
lower than they otherwise would be in the period leading up
to full releases of new information (because much information
trading is suppressed during that period), yet markedly
higher ones in the period that takes place just after those full
releases (because the information comes out with a burst of
trading when it must be made available to all at once when
first released).
The related simultaneity initiative by the NYAG has a
distinct effect on information asymmetries in the market.
When some select group of information traders receives
market-moving information two seconds before it is revealed
to the market as a whole, its members know that they have
only two seconds to capture their informational advantage.120

118
119
120

See supra section III.A.2.
See supra section III.A.1.
See supra section I.A.2.
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Those privileged traders therefore transact ferociously during
their early-peek window—meaning that there will be
markedly higher information asymmetries during those tiny
periods that occur just prior to the full public release of the
information at issue. When the information is then more
broadly released two seconds later, it has already begun to be
incorporated into market prices. In fact, if material aspects of
the new information are computer readable and their import
is clear enough, the information will be incorporated into
market prices in just a small fraction of that two-second
window.121 So, the Attorney General’s effort does little more
than move the point at which brief periods of acute
information asymmetries start forward in time from one
moment (e.g., the two-second period just prior to 10:00 a.m.)
to another that occurs just seconds later (e.g., the two-second
period that begins with the one and only public release at
10:00 a.m. sharp).
The SEC’s 2014–2015 initiative to clean up EDGAR
filings has effects that fall somewhere between those of Reg
FD and the NYAG action. However close it falls to either
depends on the length of the early release that is being
eliminated as well as the market’s awareness of the early
release itself. The effects of its elimination of minutes-early
releases of important information might loosely mirror those
of Reg FD. But it is clear that at least the end of early
releases that lasted mere seconds did little more than move
information asymmetries by that very small amount of time,
just as with the NYAG action.
Thus, the likely general overall effects of Reg FD and
recent related legal initiatives on information asymmetries in
the market around the time at which new information is
released are clear.
Reg FD leads to slightly smaller
asymmetries during prolonged Reg FD pre-release periods,
yet markedly higher ones during brief Reg FD post-release
ones. The NYAG’s initiative from the past few years simply
moves a period of acute information asymmetry from, for
example, the two seconds just prior to the public revelation of
information to the two seconds just after it. Finally, to the
extent that it stops tiered disseminations in the seconds-long
range, the SEC’s recent initiative to clean up its release of

121 See Hu et al., supra note 33, at 1–6; supra notes 45–47 and
accompanying text.
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public-company filings likely affects these asymmetries in a
similar way to the way in which the NYAG’s action affects
them. But to the extent that the effort stops opaque early
releases better measured in minutes, its effects begin to look
more like that of Reg FD.
B. Effects on the Wellbeing of Specific Groups of Ordinary
Investors
In this section, we build on our general model of
IDL-related information asymmetries by examining how the
effects of Reg FD, the NYAG action, and the 2014–2015 SEC
EDGAR initiative affect the wellbeing of ordinary investors.
Specifically, we split the universe of ordinary investors into
three groups based on how they trade, and use our
conclusions from above to see how the law affects each. By
undertaking this analysis, we do something that the
proponents of these aspects of IDL apparently have failed to
do: understand the extent to which they are theoretically
sound given their principal aim. In the end, we conclude that
despite regulators’ apparent failure to think about the actual
effects of their efforts on ordinary investors, there is reason to
believe that at least Reg FD nevertheless holds some promise
for many ordinary investors. But at the same time, it also
becomes evident that both it and the other two main efforts in
the area likely harm the most vulnerable ordinary investors.
These understandings—as well as the more general ones laid
out just above—provide valuable insights for anyone
interested in crafting IDL that better achieves its principal
stated ends. They also pave the way for us to offer reforms to
IDL that would unequivocally better achieve those ends in the
next, final Part of this Article.
1. Group #1: Ordinary Investors Who Engage in Portfolio
Trading at Random Times
Portfolio traders do not trade based on information.122 So
whether, for example, the individuals who engage in portfolio
trading directly do so before or after news comes out and
results in changes to market prices is about as relevant to
them, ex ante, as whether they trade before or after they
break for lunch. Before they trade, that sandwich-and-soda
delay may cost them thousands, or may save them
122

See supra section II.A.2.
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thousands—but each outcome has an equal chance of
occurring. So, they can accomplish their rebalancing and
similar trading by purchasing and selling when they please,
without any rush dictated by the availability of new
information. (They still may want to trade sooner rather than
later for a number of reasons—including to avoid being in an
unbalanced investment position for, for example, days
beyond the time at which they realize they are in one.)
Ultimately, then, the great majority of these traders will not
time their submission of buy-and-sell orders based on when
they expect new information to be released. Indeed, it would
be tough for them to do so given the sheer number of
potentially important information releases. Instead, they will
trade independently of the time at which information is
expected to be released.
Reg FD, once again, likely results in the market being
characterized by slightly lower information asymmetries
throughout prolonged periods before new information is
broadly disseminated, yet markedly higher ones during brief
periods just after that public (simultaneous) dissemination.123
Consequently, those Group #1 investors whose portfolio
trading happens to involve buying and selling in the long Reg
FD pre-release periods today will incur IA costs that are
slightly lower than the ones they would in the same
(pre-public-release) time periods in a world without the
regulation.
But, that enhancement to ordinary-investor
wellbeing comes at a cost: Many unfortunate Group #1
investors who engage in portfolio trading in a Reg FD brief
post-release window will suffer the markedly higher costs
associated with those dangerous periods.
For any of this first group of ordinary investors, the
chances of being left better off as a result of a trade being
executed during a long pre-release period in which
information asymmetries are lower than they otherwise would
be because of Reg FD are undoubtedly higher than that of
transacting in a brief Reg FD post-release danger zone. The
SEC regulation therefore likely leaves these investors better
off in most of their transactions—but only slightly so. In
contrast, many of the unlucky investors in this group whose
trading stumbles into the moments just after information is
released today are left significantly worse off due to the
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intensity of the information asymmetry that is compacted into
them. They incur critically higher IA costs.
Ultimately, Reg FD’s implications for these Group #1
investors’ wellbeing are ambiguous, as the relative
magnitudes and probabilities of the pre-release boon to their
welfare and the brief post-release harm to the same are
unknown. Specifically, the implications turn on the size of
the aggregate pre-release help to ordinary investors relative to
that of the aggregate post-release harm. The relative size of
each is an empirical question. But at present, it is safe to say
that the SEC—which apparently failed to spot these issues—
appears to have no basis to claim that Reg FD leaves ordinary
investors better off.
Interestingly, though, the SEC may have nevertheless
stumbled upon regulation that can actually help these
ordinary investors in a meaningful way. Savvy portfolio
trading can shield ordinary investors from circumscribed
periods of heightened information asymmetry—even when
their trading takes place at random times and without any
effort to detect post-release windows. Those savvy traders
who seek to avoid completing their non-time-sensitive trading
during periods where information asymmetries are high—all
the while without engaging in any market intelligence work
whatsoever—can deploy a relatively simple trading technique
in order to protect themselves from the markedly inferior
liquidity-provider prices associated with relatively brief
periods of acute information asymmetry: they can seek to
accomplish their trading via immediate-or-cancel limit orders
with a limit price that reflects the liquidity-provider pricing
associated with normal times. By doing so, they ensure that
their order to buy or sell either transacts at a price that
reflects only lower-grade information asymmetries, or gets
cancelled immediately.
To explain, imagine that a stock is trading at a $10.48
best (highest) bid price and $10.52 best (lowest) ask price
around a then-current market value of $10.50 per share.
And imagine that this liquidity-provider pricing with a
four-cent bid-ask spread is a typical one for this stock—that
is, it reflects the normal asymmetries in information about
the stock’s value known by information traders versus that
known by all other traders.124 The savvy portfolio trader can
124
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submit an order to buy the stock at $10.52, but place a limit
price of $10.52 on that order to make sure that it transacts at
a price no higher than that limit price. If new information
hits the market in between the time at which the savvy trader
looked at market quotes and that at which her order reaches
a trading platform, liquidity providers might adjust the
quality of their price quotes downward: to, say, $10.00 best
(highest) bid prices and $11.00 best (lowest) ask prices
around that same $10.50 market value.
Such a large
downward adjustment in the quality of their price quotes
would help protect them from being adversely selected by
better-informed traders.125 But thanks to the limit price of
$10.52, the trader’s order to buy will be cancelled rather than
transacting at an inferior $11.00 best (lowest) ask price. (As
its name suggests, an “immediate or cancel” order either
executes immediately against a quote, or gets cancelled.)
Within a short period of time measured by as little as a few
seconds,126 the new information is likely to be incorporated
into market prices. With the information asymmetry ironed
out, the trader can then return to the market to complete her
trading at the more typical liquidity-provider prices, just a
couple of pennies off from the stock’s $10.50 current market
value—thereby largely eliminating the cost associated with
the acute post-release information asymmetry.
Reg FD holds promise to help these ordinary investors
because it makes it more likely that they will be able to use
this trading technique to avoid the costs of post-release
information asymmetry. This trading tool can be deployed to
avoid transacting at markedly inferior prices caused by
considerable information asymmetry that is condensed into
milliseconds, seconds, and perhaps even minutes or more.
But it is much less effective—if effective at all—when deployed
to avoid the IA costs associated with sustained periods of
low-grade information asymmetry that results from
information seeping out to the market slowly.
This is
because the liquidity-provider prices in the market will be
only slightly inferior to normal during those periods, and

the setting of these market prices).
125 See supra section II.A.4 (describing this common liquidity-provider
response to bursts of information asymmetry today).
126 See Hu et al., supra note 33, at 22–26; supra notes 35–39, 45–47 and
accompanying text.

HAEBERLE & HENDERSON

154

INFORMATION-DISSEMINATION LAW

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol.101:PPP

because those periods are prolonged.127 The submission of
an immediate-or-cancel limit order with a conservative
enough limit price may avoid transacting against a slightly
inferior quote, but the trader seeking to avoid that low-grade
information asymmetry would have to do so over a large
enough time period to incur other costs that perhaps make it
not even worthwhile. With prices inferior by only small
amounts over such a long period, even the non-time-sensitive
trading of a portfolio trader would likely prefer to simply pay
the extra, for example, penny per share associated with the
heightened information asymmetry rather than incur the
various costs associated with holding a sub-optimal portfolio
over days or even weeks.
Thus, Reg FD compacts information asymmetries into a
smaller, acute period—thereby allowing portfolio traders to
protect themselves from much of the bite associated with the
release of new information. And although we have no reason
to believe that regulators had this in mind when
promulgating Reg FD, this apparent accidental genius of the
regulation may provide a considerable benefit to many Group
#1 investors.
We can, however, say that efforts like the one pursued by
the NYAG to stop seconds-early releases will have no net
positive or negative impact on these Group #1 ordinary
investors.
To the extent that their portfolio trades are
submitted to the market during, for example, the two seconds
before 10:00 a.m. on a day when market-moving information
is being revealed to the public at that time, ordinary investors
are now markedly better off thanks to the state-level effort.
To the extent those trades take place in the two seconds just
after that release, they are equally worse off because of the
effort. Those two effects likely more or less cancel each other
out. All that the ban does is move the two-second period of
intense information asymmetry—and therefore heightened
ordinary-investor IA cost—from one period to another.
How does the 2014–2015 SEC EDGAR initiative affect
these ordinary investors whose non-time-sensitive trading is
accomplished at random times? To the extent the effort put
an end to early releases on the order of a mere handful of
seconds, the effect on Group #1 investors mirrors that of the
NYAG action. The general result, without considering more,
127
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is thus a wash.
To the extent that it stopped tiered
dissemination on the order of minutes, the effect begins to
look closer to that of Reg FD.
But not all portfolio trading is, like that of Group #1
investors, randomly timed—including that of our second and
third groups of ordinary investors.
2. Group #2: Ordinary Investors Who Benefit from
Portfolio Trading that Seeks to Detect and Avoid the
Moments After Information Releases
Despite the steady stream of material disclosures
provided by 5,000 or so public companies in America and the
similar flow of other products with market-moving
information, it is likely that savvy portfolio traders are able to
identify when much new information will come out. It is also
likely that they became aware of the financial danger
presented by the simultaneous release of information long
before law professors figured it out. Although also apparently
not by design, Reg FD likely leaves these ordinary investors
facing lower overall IA costs—thereby providing additional
promise for ordinary investors on the whole. However, the
regulatory action to stop early releases of a mere handful of
minutes or less likely makes no difference to the IA costs they
incur at all.
Reg FD makes it easier for those who seek to detect the
heightened information asymmetries associated with the
release of information to in fact detect them, and therefore
makes it easier to avoid IA costs associated with the same.
This assertion becomes clear by quickly thinking once again
about the information asymmetries in post-release periods in
a world with Reg FD and one without it. In either world,
sophisticated portfolio traders will attempt to assemble,
balance, and liquidate pieces of their portfolios outside of the
periods that take place after information begins to be released
(whether piecemeal or to the entire market). After all, those
periods are associated with heightened IA costs—whether
slightly heightened (in the case of piecemeal releases)128 or
markedly heightened (in the case of simultaneous ones).129
When successful at doing so, they avoid trading in those
high-cost stretches. It follows that in a world in which tiered

128
129

See supra section III.A.2.
See supra section III.A.3.
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dissemination of corporate disclosures is allowed with no
limit on the duration of the early release, these savvy traders
will try to detect the asymmetries and avoid trading during
the periods. Likewise, in the current world, they will try to do
the same with respect to the brief post-release danger zones
to which Reg FD gives rise.
Crucially, however, it is almost certainly easier to detect a
brief burst of Reg FD post-release information asymmetry
than a prolonged muted post-(tiered) release one. In the Reg
FD world, firms are releasing their information at one point in
time to the public, rather than disseminating it piecemeal to
select market participants over the course of hours, days, and
even weeks. Firms have little incentive to keep mum about
such a full release of information, yet much incentive to stay
quiet about piecemeal ones. The latter allows the select
groups that received the information to earn larger profits
from it, which, if you gave someone an early look at valuable
information, you might want to allow. In short, there is more
transparency associated with full releases of information than
piecemeal ones. Although no law requires such notice, it is
thus more likely that firms will make the timing of those
public releases—as opposed to ones to select groups of
information traders—widely known ahead of time. Thus, as a
matter of theory, Reg FD leaves the ordinary investors who
engage in portfolio trading that seeks to detect and avoid the
moments after information is released better off with respect
to IA costs.
Still, it is important to emphasize a few caveats about
this theoretical Reg FD aid to ordinary investors. First, as
with the benefit to those who use limit orders to avoid brief
Reg FD bursts of information asymmetry, the one discussed
here does not seem to have driven regulatory action in the
area.
Second, Reg FD (and current IDL more broadly)
contains no notice provision with respect to the release of
new information. Instead, it merely requires corporations to
make information available to everyone when they first
release it beyond the firm. As a result, even these traders’
ability to predict the timing of Reg FD danger zones is far
from perfect. So, while some ordinary investors may be able
to benefit by moving their relatively non-time-sensitive
trading outside these post-release danger zones, most will no
doubt find themselves blindsided by them from time to time
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as the stream of new information flows to the market without
any notice whatsoever.130 Lastly, this particular Reg FD boon
to ordinary investors is only available to those who engage in
efforts to detect information asymmetries in the market.
Many ordinary investors—such as those Group #1 investors
who seek to avoid IA costs through the use of conservative
limit orders—either find such efforts unprofitable or lack the
sophistication to use them effectively.
Still, the result for these Group #2 investors is quite
different when it comes to the effect of the NYAG initiative.
Sophisticated traders who benefit from portfolio trading that
detects and avoids the moments after information release will
be unaffected by that “investor protection” work. They will be
just as likely to be able to detect the impending
two-second-early release of informational products at
9:59:58 a.m. as they are to be able to detect a simultaneous
public release of the same two seconds later at 10:00 a.m.
sharp. There is no reason to believe that those seconds-early
releases were any easier or harder to detect than today’s
perfectly simultaneous ones. The same principle applies to
the SEC initiative relating to the seconds- and minutes-early
releases of corporate filings.131 Thus, those recent campaigns
likely leave Group #2 investors no better or worse off.
In sum, as a matter of theory, Reg FD leaves some
fortunate Group #2 ordinary investors better off—even if their
avoidance and detection abilities are limited and such
130 Professional liquidity providers engage in similar detection and avoidance
techniques. See supra note 102 and accompanying text. But, they are better
positioned than even sophisticated ordinary investors to do so. Once again,
reading the news is not part of their business. See supra note 99 and
accompanying text. Instead, they learn information from the flow of buy and
sell orders sent their way. To mitigate their losses to those who do focus their
business on digesting news, they design algorithms that detect the type of
abnormal trading activity associated with information trading. For instance, a
flurry of buy orders may suggest to liquidity providers that their prices are too
low. In response, the algorithm dictates that they will not just increase their
valuation of the stock, but also that they should consider quoting inferior prices
around it for as little as a second or so until the market returns to its more
normal two-sided flow of incoming buy and sell orders. See supra notes 100–
102 and accompanying text. Thus, they are able to indirectly detect and avoid
many post-release dangers in a way in which even savvy portfolio traders are
less likely able to.
131 Interestingly, to the extent that Reg FD stops mere seconds- and
minutes-early releases (or perhaps even hours-early ones), the result is more or
less the same: little to no benefit for even these Group #2 investors. This means
that it is only Reg FD’s preclusion of larger-scale practices of tiered
dissemination that helps these investors.
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avoidance and detection was not foreseen when promulgating
the regulation.
And mere seconds- and minutes-early
simultaneity efforts like those embodied by more recent work
by the NYAG and SEC make little difference for even these
fortunate ordinary investors.
However, all of these legal efforts have yet another (and
here perverse) previously unidentified effect on ordinary
investors. This effect is specific to our third and final group
of ordinary investors, which we turn to next. And it includes
both an effect on ordinary-investor IA costs and their general
wellbeing more broadly.
3. Group #3: Ordinary Investors Who Are Duped into
Portfolio Trading or Noise Trading in the Moments After
Information Releases
Many ordinary investors intentionally engage in their
direct trading through retail-level brokerage accounts in the
moments after market-moving information is released. These
individuals generally lack institutional-level resources and
sophistication. It is thus these investors who are most
vulnerable to the unfairness about which policymakers have
long been so concerned in the IDL area as well as the
securities context more generally.132 Yet, for two reasons,
both Reg FD and the related efforts from the past few years
likely increase the size of this third group of ordinary
investors. The end result is both an increase in the amount
of IA costs incurred by these individuals, as well as a more
general decrease to their wellbeing.133
All of the equal-timing mandates under examination
promote a misunderstanding that likely has an important
negative effect on many individual investors.
The
misunderstanding is that the law has evened the playing field
between them and sophisticated information traders when it
comes to trading based on the information in market-moving
disclosures and the like. The misunderstanding is, well,
understandable: the playing-field-is-leveled message is the
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See supra section II.A.
A good number of the 11,000-plus investment funds in the United States
no doubt act in the same way when trading on behalf of ordinary investors. See
Delevingne, supra note 87 (noting the number of funds in the United states).
However, for the sake of brevity, and because the policymaker concern for
ordinary investors that motivates simultaneity efforts focuses so much on these
direct-trading individual investors, we focus only on the latter here.
133
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precise one that regulators sought to deliver and are
delivering. Regulators told these investors that they were
now on equal footing with all other market participants when
it came to first access to this information.134
But the result of this perhaps technically accurate, yet
substantively misleading, message is perverse, as adherence
to this mythical view of securities markets leads many of
these investors to conduct their portfolio trading in the
moments just after firms and other entities disseminate new
information. It is in those very moments in which these
individuals are most susceptible to the information
asymmetry
that
imposes
costs
on
them.
So,
simultaneous-dissemination requirements increase IA costs
for the many ordinary investors in this group by duping them
into conducting their portfolio trading in post-release danger
zones.
But the problem here is even larger than that presented
by simply the increased IA costs in focus thus far. All three
of the requirements examined here encourage these same
individuals to depart from the rational world of portfolio
trading, and to enter the irrational one of noise trading. Once
again, rules requiring that new information be made available
to all investors at the same exact time when first revealed
beyond the firm or the like reinforce the view that there is a
level playing field among various trader types when it comes
to the ability to procure, analyze, and trade on newly
announced information. This view is largely erroneous.
Few individuals can simply flip a switch and become
successful information traders. In fact, even the intermediary
funds through which so many ordinary individuals invest
would be hard pressed to compete as information traders
with respect to this specific type of information. Corporate
disclosures and similar informational products are often
simply announcements of valuable information (e.g., the
financial statement in the 10-Q states that earnings came in
at $2.00 per share, thus beating market estimates by $1.00
per share).
That information often has a fairly clear
consensus import for the market prices (e.g., those prices
likely undervalue the company by $0.10 per share). In at
least today’s world of highly evolved electronic trading, it is
likely that only one specific type of information trader is able
134
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to profit on the basis of the release of such
computer-readable information.
That trader is the
high-speed announcement trader.135 And there are rumored
to be only two dozen or so of these speedsters. So, when
information producers disseminate their material information
to the public in compliance with current law by releasing it to
all market participants at the exact same time, it is often only
these ones who are able to profitably trade on it right away.
But even if direct-trading individuals could compete on
speed, they would likely be better off by following a
buy-and-hold strategy of portfolio diversification. This is one
of the central implications of the two pillars of modern
corporate finance: Modern Portfolio Theory and the Efficient
Capital Markets Hypothesis.136 And the lesson that arises out
of them pertains to almost all investors who fall outside a
group consisting of professionals whose primary business is
making information-based trades in the stock market. Thus,
whether or not the information at issue is computer-readable
and profitable for only a handful of highly sophisticated
traders, leaving the world of portfolio trading to attempt to
compete with professional information traders on the analysis
of newly disclosed information is, at best, ill-advised for
individual investors. Yet the way in which the law regulates
the dissemination of market-moving information today
paradoxically encourages just that behavior.
In sum, those ordinary investors who—emboldened by
equal-timing requirements—intentionally conduct their direct
trading as portfolio traders or noise traders in post-release
danger zones are harmed by those requirements. And the
policymakers behind these laws who primarily sought to help
ordinary investors should find those results disconcerting.
After all, it is these individuals who are most susceptible to
the costs associated with a market in which some
participants will inevitably be better informed than others,
and it is also these individuals who often sit precariously on
the line that divides those who engage in portfolio trading
that generally enhances their welfare from those who engage
in noise trading that generally erodes it.
***

135 See supra section II.A.1 (providing an overview of this sub-type of
information trader).
136 See supra note 80.
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This Part has demonstrated a simple truth: the actual
effects of Reg FD and related efforts on ordinary investors are
far more complicated than simple policymaker statements
about their allegedly beneficial effects on them reflect. More
specifically, the nuanced analysis presented here has shown
what fairness-inspired simultaneity efforts actually do to the
trading environment around the times at which the
information is announced to the market—and, ultimately,
what that means for the investors who are alleged to be the
principal beneficiaries of them.
Remarkably, if enough
ordinary-investor trading takes place in the moments after
new information is released, then Reg FD’s equal-access
regulation is actually making market participation less
profitable for these investors despite the attempt to improve
their lot. At the end of the day, though, the relative size of
ordinary-investor trading that takes place in brief Reg FD
post-release danger zones versus the amount that benefits
from trading in sustained Reg FD pre-release periods in
which there are slightly lower information asymmetries than
there would otherwise be is an empirical question that sits far
beyond the scope of this study. At present, it is safe to say
that there is no basis for concluding that the net of the effects
of Reg FD on ordinary investors is significantly positive.
Likewise, the negative effect of Reg FD on vulnerable ordinary
investors is, without any dispute, out of line with regulator
intentions to improve their experience as market participants.
Moreover, that harm presented to those ordinary investors
alone may very well outweigh any of the other theoretical
gains we have identified.
All the while, there is strong reason to conclude that the
net of the effects of related prohibitions on much more
circumscribed earlier releases from the past few years
provides no benefit to ordinary investors whatsoever. From at
least the standpoint of market-microstructure economics, the
NYAG action is worthless for these investors.
In fact,
however, from a broader perspective, it is likely worse than
worthless, in that it no doubt leads to a misimpression about
the market among at least direct-trading individuals, and
thus encourages them to conduct their portfolio trading at
the wrong times, and perhaps even worse, to become noise
traders. Of course, the elimination of longer early-release
periods better measured in minutes than seconds by the SEC
as a result of its cleanup of the EDGAR system has an impact
closer to that of Reg FD. But because, when disregarding
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outliers, it at the high end eliminated only early releases of
about a few minutes, its ultimate impact has the same basic
features of the NYAG action.
Still, the magnitude of each of the negative and positive
effects of these simultaneous-dissemination requirements has
not been evidenced in any empirical study with which we are
familiar. That is not surprising. We believe this work is the
first to identify them. But it is safe to say the following:
regulators have no more basis to claim that the simultaneity
mandates that define IDL today improve ordinary-investor
welfare than we have to claim the opposite. Yet, that defining
feature of IDL has been trumpeted and expanded in recent
years. And in the next and final Part, we show that our
analysis here gives rise to a simple inference: there are a
number of ways in which IDL could be formulated to
definitively achieve its stated ends—all without the need for
any equal-timing whatsoever.
IV
REFORMING IDL WITH AN EYE ON ITS PRINCIPAL STATED GOAL
Simultaneous-dissemination requirements were primarily
set up to make participation in the stock market fairer for
ordinary investors.137 Yet, our analysis in Part III suggests
that—at a minimum—they present no obvious net benefit to
those investors. In fact, it demonstrates that some of these
requirements harm at least direct-trading individual investors
in a perverse manner. But our discussion so far also makes
something else clear: ordinary investors would be left
unequivocally better off if regulation helped them detect and
avoid the IA costs associated with the trading environment
after information is first released. It also makes clear that
they would be left better off if regulators, at a minimum, did
not indulge in mythology relating to the ability of
direct-trading individuals to compete as successful
information traders. So laws that help investors avoid the
costs associated with information release would boost their
wellbeing leaps and bounds beyond whatever is accomplished
by the current bright-line equal-timing requirements found in
the law—no matter how rhetorically pleasing they and their
equal opportunities sound. For that reason, in this final Part,
we set forth a series of reforms to show the following: even if
137
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the regulators who set forth the requirements for equally
timed information releases that must happen today did in
fact somehow stumble upon some net benefit to ordinary
investors, the chief goal that drives those requirements can
be far better achieved through more creative uses of IDL.
A. Disclosure of Disclosure
Today, no law restricts public companies and similar
information producers from releasing their information when
they please, without any advanced notice to the public
whatsoever. For this reason, even savvy ordinary investors
no doubt find themselves harmed by post-release information
asymmetries with some frequency.138 Yet, IDL could contain
a simple notice requirement that would help these investors
avoid those asymmetries—thereby leaving ordinary investors
far better off than they are today.
The exact proposal? Require information producers to
announce their intention to release any information that
stands a decent chance of moving markets, and to do so well
before making that release. The law could take a first step
along these lines by requiring public firms to make these
types of disclosures in order to inform the market as to when
they are releasing their required disclosures to the market.
We thus refer to this proposal as one for “disclosure of
disclosure.”
In an information-dissemination regime with this type of
notice feature, at least savvy portfolio traders could plan the
timing of their generally non-time-sensitive trading based on
their new knowledge as to when information will be shared.
They would thus exit the market from whenever new
information was set to be released until the point in time at
which the information was thought to be incorporated into
market prices. Even many not-so-savvy everyday individuals
who trade directly through retail-level brokerage accounts
would be able to do the same—especially if the law required
explicit notice to them through, for example, a warning
delivered through their online brokerage account that popped
up before their orders could be submitted to the market.
Although we focus on disclosure of public-company
disclosures as a first step, it bears emphasizing that this
reform could be used to protect ordinary investors with
138

See supra section III.B.2.

HAEBERLE & HENDERSON

164

INFORMATION-DISSEMINATION LAW

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol.101:PPP

respect to the dissemination of far more than simply that type
of information. There is no reason why regulators could not
apply the concept to the revelation of the information targeted
by the NYAG that is produced by universities, trade
associations, and other entities—to the extent that they do
not already provide notice on their own accord. Likewise, it is
difficult to see why various government entities that fail to
provide this type of advance notice of important information
releases should not be included among the list of information
producers that must inform the market as to their
information-release plans—if the goal of protecting ordinary
investors does in fact dominate other considerations. Like
the lack of notice associated with corporate disclosure today,
no law requires the producers of this other important
information
to
alert
the
market
as
to
their
information-dissemination plans. Consequently, requiring
this type of notice to the market would not only better protect
ordinary investors from the information asymmetries
associated with the release of the information targeted by Reg
FD and related recent simultaneity efforts, but it would also
contain the potential to protect them from a far wider range of
those asymmetries.
To be sure, without some upward limit on the amount of
time in which new information could be dripped out to the
market, any of these types of disclosure-of-disclosure
changes may prove of limited use to portfolio traders that are
trying to avoid dangerous post-release trading environments.
After all, if the information producer leaked the information
into the marketplace over a matter of days or weeks starting
at noon on Wednesday, our notice that new information will
begin coming out then might do ordinary investors little good.
This is because the select traders with first access to the
information might be able to at least tacitly agree to trade
slowly under the radar so that their informational advantage
might last over a sustained period.
Moreover, the mere announcement that market-moving
information will be on its way soon (e.g., in two hours at
noon) may create a loosely related problem: an increase in IA
costs imposed on ordinary investors between the
announcement time (10:00 a.m.) and the first release (noon)
alone. The end result would be an extension of the length of
the problematic window of information asymmetry to include
that time period.
Lastly, with respect to public-company disclosure, there
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would also undoubtedly be instances in which the release of
one company’s disclosure would have implications for
information asymmetries relating to other companies’ stock.
Indeed, the existence of those instances might be even more
common than their absence.
The law could address all of these concerns without
defaulting to an insistence on simultaneity. For example, the
law could merely add an “information-dissemination shot
clock” like the one we discuss below to ensure that the
post-release information asymmetries were contained to an
easily avoidable period of time. And it could rely on savvy
portfolio traders’ understanding, for example, that the
expectation of new information from Apple from noon to 2:00
p.m. means that they should stay away from the market for
Samsung during those two hours as well. But because of
these concerns with mere disclosure of disclosure, if the law
is to go down this road of reforming IDL along these lines to
ensure that it actually furthers its primary stated goals, it
should prefer a more robust reform to IDL—like the one we
discuss next.
B. Set Information-Release Windows with an
Information-Dissemination Shot Clock
A second, larger reform would be to build on the
protections associated with disclosure of disclosure. There
are many ways in which regulators could do so. Here we
discuss
the
broad
contours
of
one
such
way:
requiring set information-release
windows
with
an
information-dissemination shot clock.
This reform would involve a requirement that the release
of information occur within circumscribed windows set out in
a transparent manner well ahead of time.
This
farther-reaching change to IDL would provide portfolio
traders with notice of likely periods of high information
asymmetry, just as disclosure of disclosure would.
To emphasize the point, the duration of the set
information windows in which information could be released
to the market would have to be capped for the reform to carry
out its full potential. We refer to such a time-restriction
provision as a “dissemination shot clock.” This shot clock
would give information producers a set amount of time to
complete their dissemination of new information, from initial
selective revelation beyond the firm or the like to the time at
which the information is made available to the public more
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generally. Unaccompanied by such a restriction, entities
might reveal information piecemeal over long periods—leaving
portfolio traders unable to identify exactly when within those
periods they will be prone to significantly heightened IA costs.
In fact, if the information revelation was dribbled out to the
market slowly enough, and the trading based on that dribble
undiscernible enough, portfolio traders might have to avoid
the market long enough to impede even their generally
non-time-sensitive trading goals.
Of course, the clock may be set for as little as a second or
two, as was done by the market in the University of Michigan
example.139 But the clock could also be set for a much longer
duration, perhaps up to a day or more. The University of
Michigan and select information traders may very well have
come up with such an arrangement on their own if not for the
fear of regulatory action or related public-perception issues.
Whether or not the law should allow such a long shot
clock given how information asymmetries could be hidden
within the release period is a different question. But it is
worth noting that even day-long maximum duration may do
the trick. In fact, if the shot clock were set toward the longer
end of the spectrum, portfolio traders might even be able to
safely enter the market toward the middle or end of the
dissemination window. This is because one can assume that
information asymmetries would be greatly reduced by then,
after the first information traders to receive the information
transact fast and furiously in the early part of the
tiered-release window, knowing of their circumscribed
early-release advantage.140
Whether set for a second or a day, with information
revelation restricted to a relatively short, well-defined, and
transparent window along these lines, ordinary investors and
those trading on their behalf with notice as to when that time
began and ended could temporarily exit the market. That exit
would allow them—at minimum private costs—to avoid much
of the IA costs associated with information release. They
could then return to the market to complete their portfolio
trading as they please.
139

See supra notes 35–37 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 70–71 and accompanying text (explaining why
information traders aim to buy and sell quickly when they anticipate
competition and the informational advantage ending within a small time
period).
140
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Moreover, this second reform would also curtail those
periods in a manner that helps ameliorate all of the issues on
which we touched with respect to mere disclosure of
disclosure alone. The set windows we envision would be for
all information producers. Those market-wide windows could
be part of the structure of stock trading at all exchanges and
off-exchange trading venues. For example, they could be but
a minute long, and positioned as frequently as on the hour
every hour during the heart of the regular trading day. That
type of set, transparent information-release window would
leave the beginning and end of regular trading unchanged
while also avoiding the effects of any idiosyncrasies
associated with the opening and closing of the trading day.
Or, the window could be set for all covered information
producers for one hour each Wednesday, smack in middle of
the trading week—thereby accomplishing much of the same,
albeit perhaps with less disturbance of regular trading than
that associated with even mere minute-long releases at the
top of all midday trading hours. Or, lastly, the start times
could even be set for after regular trading hours.
Likewise, the chances of information that is relevant for
the trading environment associated with any given stock
being released are still small. This means that the extent of
any pre-window information asymmetry would be greatly
mitigated.
Thus, the scheduling of, for example, set
minute-long information-release windows at the start of each
trading hour, would be far less likely to result in any
significant buildup of information asymmetry toward the end
of each hour as would one-off announcements associated
with disclosure of disclosure alone.
Lastly, the temporary, protective retreats we envision
would likely be market-wide given that all new
market-moving information (and not just one firm’s) would
have to be released in these set windows. This would
eliminate the Apple-news-has-relevance-to-Samsung-stock
problem, as portfolio traders would no longer have that type
of challenge with respect to trying to determine just how
widespread their withdrawal from the market should be when
any one individual source of information is released.
Of course, if having these set windows of information
release at the top of each midday trading hour (or even once a
day for a few minutes at noon) is too disruptive for
ordinary-investor wellbeing or trading more generally, then
the frequency of those windows could be limited to as little
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as, for example, one time per week for all information
producers. Such an information-release window could take
place each Wednesday from noon to 1:00. While this type of
interval may at first glance appear problematic for the flow of
information from information producers to the public, the
main benefits to which that flow is thought to lead (the
improved capital allocation and corporate governance
associated with more accurate stock pricing)141 are unlikely to
require prices with more and better information each and
every day. Indeed, the main law aimed at enhancing price
accuracy
in
order
to
improve
those
ends
(mandatory-disclosure law) only requires firms to make
far-ranging disclosures on their prospects on a periodic basis
more easily measured in fiscal quarters than days.142
Moreover, the law could of course make an exception for the
release of urgent information, with administrative censure
perhaps being enough to ensure that such an
exceptional-circumstances caveat would not be abused.
Thus, instituting set information-release windows with a
maximum information-dissemination shot clock represents a
second, broader way in which IDL could be shaped to leave
ordinary investors far better off than they are today. All the
while, no law requiring information to be made available to all
market participants at the exact same time would be
necessary. Nor would any additional examination of the
nuanced and hard-to-quantify effects of Reg FD and the
related recent efforts on ordinary investors—which presently
are far from clear and open to substantial critique.
***
This final Part demonstrated that IDL can be shaped to
help ordinary investors in a manner far beyond whatever is
accomplished by its current one-dimensional focus on
simultaneity.
Specifically, it has presented examples of
reforms to this emerging area of the law that would result in
unambiguous, material improvements to ordinary-investor
wellbeing. Thus, it offered changes to the way in which the
revelation of market-moving information is regulated that
would better meet the primary policymaker goal in the area
than the current unimaginative approach that centers on
141

See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
The United States is a periodic-disclosure jurisdiction, meaning firms are
not required to disclose all compelled information as they learn of it on any kind
of continuous basis, but only in an “ongoing, periodic” manner.
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equally timed dissemination to all. And given that there is
little basis for concluding that the current regime and its
central attribute do much—if anything—toward that end, the
ideas for change should have considerable appeal for
policymakers.
Of paramount importance, however, whether or not these
reforms are welfare enhancing for society, as opposed to just
one subset of the investing community, is something we have
not analyzed.
Instead, we have taken the law and
policymakers on their own terms—attempting to restrict our
focus to the relatively narrow set of issues relating to the
primary stated goal in each of the simultaneity initiatives in
focus here. We must therefore caution against irrational
exuberance toward our proposals. After all, our proposals no
doubt have costs. Whether the ordinary-investor benefits to
which they lead outweigh those costs is a distinct issue to the
ones addressed in Parts III (whether the defining feature of
IDL today enhances ordinary-investor welfare at all) and IV
(whether IDL can be shaped in a manner that would
unambiguously achieve that end).
What are the main costs of the proposals?
For one thing, by protecting ordinary investors, proposals
like the ones described here take away profits from
information traders—thereby reducing the incentive to engage
in price-correcting work on the part of the latter. The result
of implementing the proposals without safeguards for the
production of accurate stock prices might therefore be
undesirable.
For another, perhaps perceptions matter more than
reality, and if implemented without still requiring
simultaneity, our proposals would result in harms associated
with perceptions of unfairness. The feeling—in and of itself—
of unfairness associated with a major institution in society
involving unequal access to information represents a social
harm. Moreover, that social harm might be especially acute
when the perceived unfairness involves the perception of
unevenness between a group of individuals within the top 1%
of wealth in society (here, the individuals whose money
stands behind information traders) and a group of individuals
with more varied financial net worths. Additionally, the costs
associated with any lower levels of ordinary-investor
confidence in the market that arose out of the perception
might lead to lower levels of ordinary-investor participation in
the market. The costs of such reduced investment can be

HAEBERLE & HENDERSON

170

INFORMATION-DISSEMINATION LAW

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol.101:PPP

quite serious, including illiquidity, a higher cost of capital for
firms, and a lower level of stock-price accuracy.
We scratch the surface on these considerable concerns
here merely to ensure caution among regulators when
pursuing reforms to IDL.
But given these considerable
concerns with even reforms to IDL that unambiguously
improve ordinary-investor wellbeing, we therefore step back
to gain perspective and ask what are perhaps the most
important questions of all those asked thus far: Should IDL
even be used in order to help ordinary investors? And, is its
present form fine—albeit for all the wrong reasons, if you take
policymakers at their word with respect to the primary
rationale behind simultaneity today?
Answering this and related questions would require a
good amount of further study. But as we approach our
concluding thoughts, we note merely the following three
broad points. First, we have discerned an emerging area of
securities law that we believe is analytically distinct from the
areas in which it has been lumped (securities-disclosure law
when it comes to Reg FD, and insider-trading law it comes to
at least the NYAG effort). Second, that the area’s defining
feature today has an ambiguous and difficult-to-quantify
effect on ordinary-investor wellbeing despite its main stated
end. Third, the area can easily be shaped to far better
achieve that end, for example, by pursuing the types of
reforms we introduced here. We have also added caution into
the mix due to larger considerations of securities law—
namely, those relating to stock-price accuracy and (even
false) perceptions of ordinary-investor danger. But we would
be remiss in not bringing up one final intriguing issue
presented by these findings: can this area of law that has
been to date thought of only as a one-trick pony be developed
in a creative way to improve ordinary-investor wellbeing,
stock-price accuracy, and perceptions of fairness all at the
same time? In addition to taking note of what our journey in
this paper has revealed in more detail, we touch on this
question and the potential for IDL to be shaped in such a
manner to improve securities law on the whole in the
Conclusion.
CONCLUSION
When it comes to the market-moving information around
which modern federal securities law has long revolved,
policymakers and those to whom they appeal have often

HAEBERLE & HENDERSON

2016]

INFORMATION-DISSEMINATION LAW

INFORMATION-DISSEMINATION LAW

171

suffered from a blind devotion to fairness-inspired legal
interventions. The extent to which the foundation of that
body of law (mandatory-disclosure law) and its two main
overlays (securities-fraud law and insider-trading law) are in
fact justified on fairness grounds has been hotly debated. Yet
despite the controversy, the faith has remained unquestioned
when it comes to the newest addition to this disclosure-based
area of the law—an area that we have named
information-dissemination law.
In this Article, we questioned important securities laws
and the reasoning behind them, taking a first step toward
better understanding them. More specifically, we reviewed a
series of regulatory initiatives that have been thus far treated
as discrete. Stepping back to view them together, however,
we asserted that the efforts were all representative of an
emerging area of law. And we pointed out that the defining
feature of that area today is found in the requirement that
market-moving information must be made available to all
investors at the same exact time when first revealed.
But, as shown in the Article, the assumption that the
protection of ordinary investors compels the dissemination of
such valuable information to all at once is not supported by
the reality of interactions in the stock market today.
Moreover, the monolithic focus on simultaneity in IDL has
eclipsed the identification of a broader set of issues relating to
how the revelation of this important information should be
regulated, thereby blocking policymakers from even noticing
that there is an area of law here with fascinating potential
uses.
More specifically, we detailed how the hallmark of IDL is
simultaneity in the name of ordinary-investor fairness. Yet
we showed, as a matter of theory, that the effects of the main
example of IDL (Reg FD) on ordinary investors are far from
clear—and that the regulation perversely left the most
vulnerable ordinary investors worse off. We also explained
why at least one related simultaneity effort from the past few
years likely left ordinary investors worse off altogether.
Given these findings, the Article presented new ideas for
shaping IDL in order to unequivocally better achieve the
primary regulator goal in the area. Proposals based on our
thinking, such as the two concrete ones we set forth, would
without any doubt help everyday investors better avoid the
dangers associated with the revelation of new information to
the market. After all, disclosure of disclosure would allow
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them to steer clear of town when the slaughterhouse is open
for business, and set information-release windows with
information-dissemination shot clocks would do the same—
albeit with even broader protections.
There are still of course other fairness-inspired reforms
that are consistent with our thinking. For example, whether
in addition to one of the above reforms or on its own, there is
something even more basic that the SEC could do that might
be in and of itself more helpful than compelling the
simultaneous release of information: provide ordinary
investors with some simple information on how to protect
themselves from a market that will be characterized by
dangerous information asymmetries as new important
information is being revealed. More specifically, the SEC—
through its Office of Investor Education and Advocacy—could
engage in an educational campaign.
The campaign we
envision would encourage ordinary investors to participate in
the stock market through sophisticated funds that simply
index the market rather than on their own—although other
creative similar alternatives on which we are less bullish exist
too (e.g., those associated with educating individual investors
on the use of beneficial trading techniques143).
The
educational effort would thus likely both help reduce the
extent to which these investors are harmed by the
information asymmetries associated with the release of new
information, and the extent to which they participate in the
market as noise traders.
But all of these ideas focused on protecting ordinary
investors merely scratch the surface of IDL, as how society
regulates the revelation of market-moving information has
implications that emanate far beyond that one securities-law
goal to affect current thinking about the ends of securities
regulation on the whole.
For one thing, the tenets established in this paper open
the door to the intriguing question posed at the close of Part
IV: Can this emerging area of the law be shaped in a manner
that addresses concerns for ordinary-investor fairness,
ordinary-investor perceptions of unfairness, and stock-price
accuracy all at the same time? Our inclination is that this
question might be answered in the affirmative. For example,

143 See supra section III.A.1 (discussing one such trading technique that can
sometimes be used by portfolio traders in order to limit the IA costs they incur).
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if tiered dissemination of new information is not necessary to
achieve current levels of ordinary-investor wellbeing, then
why not allow companies to sell early-access rights to their
disclosures in a well-regulated market for early access to
corporate disclosures? If firms were able to sell early-access
products with required disclosure of disclosure or within set
information-release windows with information-dissemination
shot clocks, then market forces could go to work in a manner
that would provide them with powerful incentives to produce
and share more robust disclosures than merely those
required by mandatory-disclosure law today. So, the market
would get more of the information that it wants. All the
while, ordinary investors would be left far better off than they
are today. Likewise, so long as all information traders were
able to access corporate disclosures equally at the time of
their initial release, any Reg FD-style concern for the integrity
and competitiveness of the price-discovery process144 may be
largely muted.
For another thing, thinking about IDL as an area of law
that can be shaped to bring about a number of ends beyond
mere enhanced fairness leads to an additional insight: IDL
can
be
used
to
address
more
than
even
securities-law issues relating to the disclosure of information.
For example, set information-release
windows
with
an information-dissemination shot clock could help move
insider-trading law forward.
Ordinary-investor fairness
concerns have long animated policymaker action in that area
of securities law as well—even if most scholarly
commentators today believe there is no fairness issue
whatsoever. To the extent that fairness is an issue in that
area, could it not be greatly reduced by implementing a
simple requirement that insiders trading based on material,
non-public information must do so during set windows—for
example, from noon to 1:00 each trading day? Of course,
there are other concerns about allowing insiders to trade
based on this information (namely ones for stock-price
accuracy145).
Whether or not our information-release
windows provide promise to address these concerns is an
issue far beyond the scope of the current work. But it is clear
that those windows—at a minimum—would clean up the law

144
145

See supra section I.B.1.c.
See Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 53.
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by removing much of the need (if any in the first place) to be
concerned for the wellbeing of ordinary investors that results
from insider trading. Perhaps most importantly, such an
approach might open up space for a clearer understanding as
to why we have insider-trading law in the first place. After
all, if those windows take care of the ordinary-investor
concern, the limits on insider trading would presumably have
to be supported by consensus thinking on the practice’s
harm to price accuracy or some other social good.
We will stop there with respect to these ideas for
reforming IDL to allow for a well-regulated market for early
access to corporate disclosures or a better insider-trading
regime. The former part-regulatory-based, part-market-based
framework for the dissemination of new information has
price-accuracy (and other) positive implications that go well
beyond the typical focus of regulators when it comes to the
timing of information dissemination. And the latter has the
potential to address what has long been one of the most
controversial issues in securities law. But by introducing the
ideas here, we further contextualize our criticisms of current
IDL (namely, its current monolithic focus and lack of
imagination). And we open the door for thinking about how
IDL can be crafted to better achieve the larger goals of the
field—all the while without transferring wealth from, at a
minimum, the most vulnerable ordinary investors to
professional ones as it does today.
To us, closing with these implications that go far beyond
the effects of Reg FD and the like is a natural consequence of
thinking about IDL as an area of securities law rather than a
simple one-trick pony that works well in sound bites. To be
sure, we cannot say for certain that the implementation of
some combination of one or more of our IDL proposals would
provide a lower cost means of obtaining the current levels of
ordinary-investor wellbeing. We likewise cannot say for sure
that any benefits relating to higher levels of ordinary-investor
wellbeing would outweigh their costs. Likewise, there has
been no study to date of whether or not both
ordinary-investor wellbeing and price accuracy would be
materially improved if firms were allowed to sell their
disclosures in a market for early access to corporate
disclosures that incorporated the regulatory safeguards
embodied in our thinking on IDL. And implementing set
insider-trading windows could have all sorts of negative
effects on, for example, perceptions in a society where so
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many object to the power and wealth of so few. We leave the
analysis of the desirability of at least wider changes to IDL
and the considerable shift to the approach of modern
securities regulation embodied in them to distinct study. But
we can say that we have opened the door to thoughtful and
valuable innovation in an area of securities law
(information-dissemination law) that has received little
attention relative to the main mandatory-disclosure,
securities-fraud, and insider-trading law focuses of the field.
Two final concluding points bear mention. First and
foremost, it is important to emphasize the drawbacks of
implementing our ordinary-investor-friendly proposals. As we
discussed at the close of Part IV, it is likely that our reforms
have down sides.
For one thing, concerns relating to
perceptions of unfairness alone might prove to be a
recalcitrant enemy—no matter what the reality of the
situation is. For another, trade-offs associated with the
incentive to produce information about firms’ prospects might
be unavoidable when shaping IDL in a manner that protects
ordinary investors from information asymmetries.
Indeed, the latter concern alone raises an important
conceptual point for the law. If the status quo is preferable to
our reforms because of a concern for the ability of
information traders to earn profits from ordinary investors,
then the law should be transparent about its intent. The
continuation of existing IDL should therefore be justified not
based on what it does to protect ordinary investors, but
rather based on how efficiently it guides lambs to the
slaughterhouse to satisfy information-trading appetites—all
in the name of price accuracy. Ironically, despite all of the
ordinary-investor rhetoric, the main clear advantage of an
information-dissemination regime built on equally timed
access to information over one built on disclosure of
disclosure or the like is that the former is better for funding
information traders. So if the law opts to go with the status
quo because of its importance to the price-discovery process
despite the effects on ordinary investors identified here, a
recognition of the truth of that conclusion among
policymakers and commentators alone would represent an
important step forward for the law in and of itself.
Second, and lastly, on a broader level, our analysis
provides yet another example in the growing pile of examples
of securities-law works that recognize the realities of
contemporary securities markets and differentiate between
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different types of market participants.146 Taken together,
these works and their incorporation of concepts from
market-microstructure economics are providing a force that
even the most entrenched ideas and government officials will
not be able to resist. That force is pushing in favor of
recognizing that, despite conventional wisdom about
irreconcilable differences and trade-offs among different types
of market participants with different types of goals, those
participants can prosperously co-exist in securities markets.
Adding to this growing literature represents an important
step forward for the law in and of itself. Encouraging
analysis of the law that is consistent with reality alone
represents progress.

146 See generally Merritt B. Fox, Lawrence R. Glosten & Gabriel V.
Rauterberg, The New Stock Market: Sense and Nonsense, 65 DUKE L.J. 191, 196
(2015) (describing a conceptual framework of stock market analysis based on
“adverse selection, the principle-agent problem, and a multi-venue trading
system”); Fox, Glosten & Rauterberg, supra note 73; Haeberle, supra note 67, at
122 (asserting that regulators can reform little-noticed stock-market rules to
materially improve the accuracy of public companies’ stock prices); Haeberle,
supra note 104; Kevin S. Haeberle & M. Todd Henderson, Making a Market for
Corporate Disclosure (U. Chi. Coase-Sandor Inst. for L. & Econ. Research Paper
No. 769, 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2814125
[https://perma.cc/HXG5-2C37].

